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PARTIES TO THE APPEAL 
Although there are numerous entities involved in the primary 
SAIC liquidation proceeding, Case No. 920901617, only two 
entities are parties to the present appeal: 
1. Golfland Entertainment-Centers, Inc. ("Golfland"). 
Appellant. 
2. Utah Insurance Commissioner, as Liquidator of Southern 
American Insurance Company (the "Liquidator"). Appellee. 
RELATED PARTIES 
1. BCD Corporation ("BCD"). At all times relevant to this 
dispute, the Liquidator owned and controlled BCD. Len Stillman, 
deputy insurance liquidator, is the President of BCD. 
2. CDX Corporation ("CDX"). At all times relevant to this 
dispute, the Liquidator owned and controlled CDX. Len Stillman, 
deputy insurance liquidator, is the President of CDX. 
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STATEMENT OF JURISDICTION 
The Utah Court of Appeals has jurisdiction in this matter 
pursuant Utah Code Ann. § 78-2a-3(j). 
STATEMENT OF ISSUES PRESENTED FOR REVIEW 
A. Statement of Issues 
1. Is the July 7 Order internally inconsistent?1 
(a) Did the Lower Court adjudicate all claims arising out 
of the Barn Contract? or, 
(b) Did the Lower Court rule solely on the issue whether 
Golfland is entitled to specific performance on the 
sale of the Barn? 
2. Did the Lower Court commit procedural errors?2 
(a) Did the Lower Court usurp the role of the jury by 
acting as the finder-of-fact as to disputed factual 
issues? 
(b) Did the Lower Court err in finding that "evidence was 
submitted with the pleadings"? 
(c) Did the Lower Court err in denying Golfland the right 
to a trial - - o r even an evidentiary hearing -- as to 
the claims raised against the Liquidator? 
3. Are the Lower Court's factual findings necessary to the 
Court's Ruling, or are they merely dicta?3 
1
 Because the questions surrounding the scope of the Lower 
Court's Ruling did not, and could not, arise until after the 
Order was entered, this specific issue was not ripe and was 
therefore not specifically raised by Golfland in the Court below. 
Nevertheless, Golfland did raise the issue generally by arguing 
that the Lower Court was prohibited from adjudicating Golfland's 
Complaint absent a full jury trial on the merits. (See Record 
("R.") at 2551-52). 
2
 In the Court below, Golfland argued that it was entitled 
to a jury and a trial at R. 2551-2552. Golfland argued that no 
admissible evidence was submitted with the pleadings at R. 3063. 
3
 This issue did not become ripe until after the Lower Court 
issued its Ruling. Accordingly, Golfland did not specifically 
raise this issue in the Court below. Golfland did raise the 
issue generally by arguing that there was no admissible evidence 
upon which such factual findings could be based. (See R. 3 063). 
1 
4. Assuming that admissible evidence was presented to the 
Court, are the Court's factual findings supported by the 
evidence in the record?4 
5. Did the Lower Court err in failing to consider whether the 
Liquidator caused the failure of conditions precedent?5 
6. Did the Lower Court err in failing to consider whether the 
Liquidator waived the occurrence of the conditions 
precedent?6 
7. Did the Lower Court err in finding that Golfland's tender of 
the purchase price was insufficient?7 
8. Did the Lower Court err in failing to consider whether the 
Liquidator waived the right to demand a different tender of 
the purchase price?8 
9. In determining whether to enforce Judge Stirba's February 24 
Order approving the sale of the Barn to Golfland, did the 
Lower Court err in failing to apply the "shocks the 
conscience" standard?9 
10. Did the Lower Court err in finding that the Barn property is 
not "unique" so as to justify a claim for specific 
performance?10 
4
 Golfland argued against the Court's factual findings at R. 
2020-2048. 
5
 This argument was raised in the Lower Court at R. 2 029-
2037. 
6
 This argument was raised in the Lower Court at R. 2 03 7-
2045; 2047-2048. 
7
 This argument was raised in the Lower Court at R. 2 045-
2048. 
8
 This argument was raised in the Lower Court at R. 2047-
2048. 
9
 This argument was raised in the Lower Court at R. 2020-
2026. 
10
 No party raised this issue in the Court below. Rather, 
the Lower Court made a finding sua sponte, with no basis 
whatsoever in the record to support the finding, that the Barn 
property was not "unique" and did not qualify for a claim of 
specific performance. This finding was apparently based upon the 
Judge's personal experience with the property approximately 20 
years ago. (See Part III.A., infra). 
B. Standard of Review 
In the present case, all issues on appeal -- both factual 
and legal -- are subject to de novo review without according any 
deference to the Lower Court, as follows: 
Factual Findings: In this case, the parties dispute whether 
there was any admissible evidence upon which factual findings 
could be based. (See Part II. C , infra) . Nevertheless, it is 
undisputed that the only evidence in the record, if any, was 
submitted in the form of documentation attached to the memoranda 
of the parties. Thus, all factual findings of the Lower Court 
are subject to a de novo standard of review. 
Because the trial court's finding was based solely 
upon . . . written materials and involved no 
assessment of witness credibility or competency, 
this court is in as good a position as the trial 
court to examine the evidence [if any] de novo and 
determine the facts. 
In re Infant Anonymous, 760 P.2d 916, 918 (Utah App. 1988)). 
Accordingly, this Court should give no deference whatsoever to 
the purported "factual findings" of the Lower Court. 
Legal Findings: All legal issues on appeal are reviewed 
"for correctness, without according deference to the trial 
court's legal conclusions." See Bonham v. Morgan, 788 P.2d 497, 
499 (Utah 1989). 
CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS, STATUTES, ORDINANCES, RULES, 
REGULATIONS WHOSE INTERPRETATION IS DETERMINATIVE TO ISSUES ON 
APPEAL 
Golfland submits that the Court's attempt to adjudicate 
Golfland's claims without providing a jury trial or even an 
evidentiary hearing is a violation of due process and the right 
3 
to a jury trial guaranteed by the Constitutions of Utah and the 
United States. 
United States Constitution 
Amendment VII. In Suits at common law, where the value in 
controversy shall exceed twenty dollars, the right of trial 
by jury shall be preserved, and no fact tried by a jury, 
shall be otherwise re-examined in any court of the United 
States, than according to the rules of the common law. 
Amendment XIV, Section 1. All persons born or 
naturalized in the United States, and subject to the 
jurisdiction thereof, are citizens of the United States 
and of the State wherein they reside. No State shall 
make or enforce any law which shall abridge the 
privileges or immunities of citizens of the United 
States; nor shall any State deprive any person of life, 
liberty, or property, without due process of law; nor 
deny to any person within its jurisdiction the equal 
protection of the laws. 
Constitution of Utah 
Article I, Section 7. No person shall be deprived of life, 
liberty or property, without due process of law. 
Article I, Section 10. In capital cases the right of trial 
by jury shall remain inviolate. In courts of general 
jurisdiction, except in capital cases, a jury shall consist 
of eight jurors. In courts of inferior jurisdiction a jury 
shall consist of four jurors. In criminal cases the verdict 
shall be unanimous. In civil cases three-fourths of the 
jurors may find a verdict. A jury in civil cases shall be 
waived unless demanded. 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
Nature of the Case 
This is an appeal from the July 7, 1995 Order (the "July 7 
Order")11 of Judge Henriod of the Third District Court of Salt 
Lake County (the "Lower Court") holding that the Liquidator may 
sell certain real property, an office building known as the 
"Barn", free and clear of Golfland's specific performance claim. 
11
 See R. 3131-3136. A true and correct copy of the July 7 
Order is contained in the Addendum at pp. 53-58. 
4 
Golfland initially filed an appeal of the July 7 Order on July 
25, 1995. On December 27, 1996, the Utah Court of Appeals ruled 
that the July 7 Order was not a final order and dismissed 
Golfland's appeal as premature. On July 22, 1997, the Lower 
Court entered and Order certifying the July 7 Order as final 
pursuant to U.R.C.P 54(b). 
Procedural and Factual Background 
A. The Liquidation Proceedings 
1. In 1992, the Liquidator was appointed as liquidator of 
Southern American Insurance Company ("SAIC") pursuant to the Utah 
Insurance Code, Utah Code Ann. § 31A-27-101 et. sea. (See R. 
1890 at 1 1). 
2. The SAIC insurance liquidation is governed by the Third 
Judicial District Court of Salt Lake County, Case No. 920901617 
(the "Lower Court"). Originally, Judge Stirba presided over the 
SAIC liquidation proceedings. Thereafter, Judge Henriod became a 
District Judge and was assigned to preside over the liquidation 
case. 
3. The present litigation arises solely out of the conduct 
of the Liquidator subsequent to the Liquidator's appointment as 
liquidator of SAIC. (See Golfland's Proposed Complaint at R. 
1789-1814). 
4. The Liquidator is the owner of the Barn pursuant to its 
appointment as liquidator of SAIC. (See R. 1986 at 1 1). 
B. The February 22 Contract for the Sale of the Barn 
5. On February 22, 1994, pursuant to a judicial auction 
and sale -- wherein Golfland was the highest bidder, the 
Liquidator and Golfland entered a contract for the sale and 
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purchase of the Barn (the "Barn Contract"). The Barn was to be 
sold in conjunction with two other parcels of adjacent property 
(the "Water Park" and "Shed") owned by entities controlled by the 
Liquidator.12 (See R. 1988-1990 at 11 9-16). 
6. On February 24, 1994, the Liquidation Court (the 
Honorable Judge Stirba) entered an Order approving the sale of 
the Barn to Golfland pursuant to the Barn Contract (the "February 
24 Order"). (See February 24 Order at R. 1534-1542; See 
generally R. 1990 at 1 17). 
7. The Barn Contract consisted of both written and oral 
terms. Three terms are particularly pertinent in the present 
appeal: 
a. The "Simultaneous Closing Provision". The 
Barn Contract contained a provision requiring that the 
sale of the Barn be closed simultaneously with the 
closing on the sale of the Water Park and Shed. 
b. The "Timing Provisions". The Barn Contract 
contained a provision requiring that closing on the 
sale of the Barn was to take place before a certain 
date. The Barn Contract also contained a "time is of 
the essence" provision. 
c. The "Best Efforts Provision". The Barn 
Contract contained a "best efforts" provision wherein 
the parties agreed to pursue diligently and use their 
best efforts to satisfy the conditions to closing. 
(See R. 1990-1992 at 11 19-27). 
C. Golfland's Tender of the Purchase Price 
8. Within two weeks from the date of the auction, Golfland 
was prepared to tender its purchase price and complete the sale 
of the Barn and related property -- contingent only upon the 
Liquidator's performance. The Liquidator, however, was not 
12
 The Water Park was owned by BCD. The Shed was owned by 
CDX. 
prepared to close the sale at that time. Accordingly, the 
Liquidator instructed Golfland to deposit its purchase price with 
the Title Company until the time that closing could be completed. 
The parties arranged to complete the sale on April 8, 1994. (See 
R. 1994 at 1 32; R. 2016-2019 at 11 104-113). 
9. As instructed by the Liquidator, Golfland placed the 
entire purchase price ($2,600,000) for the three Seven Peaks 
properties with the Title Company. (See id.). 
10. Because the Liquidator was unable to convey title to 
the Title Company, Golfland instructed the Title Company to hold 
the purchase price for the benefit of Golfland until further 
notice by Golfland. Golfland sent a copy of its tender 
instruction letter to the Liquidator. (See id.). 
11. The Liquidator raised no objections whatsoever as to 
the adequacy of Golfland's tender. Indeed, on several occasions 
thereafter, the Liquidator represented that Golfland's tender was 
wholly sufficient and that Golfland had done "all that they had 
to do." (See id.) . 
D. The Liquidator Causes Conditions Precedent to Fail 
12. Thereafter, the Liquidator, through neglect and 
intentional conduct, pursued a course of action which caused 
conditions precedent in the Barn Contract to fail. Specifically, 
the Liquidator neglected to obtain court approval for the sale of 
the Water Park which was sufficient to withstand a legal 
challenge brought by an unsuccessful bidder.13 The Liquidator 
13
 Peak Investments, Inc. ("Peak"), an unsuccessful bidder 
at the auction, filed a motion challenging the Court's approval 
of the sale of the Water Park. Subsequently, Peak prevailed on 
its motion and the Bankruptcy Court's approval of the sale of the 
7 
knew, or should have known that additional court approval would 
be needed in light of the fact that the parties had entered a new 
agreement designed to supplement the previous contract for the 
sale of the Water Park. The Liquidator also engaged in secret 
negotiations, double dealing, and misrepresentations which caused 
the unsuccessful bidder to file its legal challenge to the sale 
of the Water Park. (See R. 1997-1999 at M 45-49) .14 
E. Failure to Close on the Sale of the Barn 
13. Because of the legal challenge pending against the 
Water Park, the Liquidator was unable to obtain title insurance 
for the Water Park and was unable to close the sale of the Water 
Park at the April 8, 1994 scheduled closing. (See R. 2003 at HH 
56-57). 
14. Under the Simultaneous Closing Provision of the Barn 
contract, the sale of the Barn could not close because of the 
failure to close on the Water Park. (See id.). 
F. Subsequent Arrangements to Complete the Sale of the Barn 
15. On April 8, 1994, the Liquidator waived the Timing 
Provisions of the Barn Contract and indicated that, 
notwithstanding the Timing Provisions, the parties would work 
together to obtain proper court approval and title insurance 
Water Park was withdrawn. 
14
 Obviously, the Liquidator disputes some of Golfland's 
factual allegations. Nevertheless, Golfland submits that for 
purposes of this appeal, all allegations in Golfland's Complaint 
should be deemed as true. Golfland has not been given an 
evidentiary hearing in which to adjudicate these allegations. 
Until and unless Golfland is given a jury trial on these issues, 
such allegations should be viewed in a light most favorable to 
Golfland. 
8 
necessary so that the sale of the three properties could be 
completed simultaneously. (See R. 2003-2006 at H1 58-63). 
16. Subsequently, when it became apparent that Court 
approval for the sale of the Water Park would not be immediately 
forthcoming, the Liquidator waived the Simultaneous Closing 
Provision and indicated a willingness to complete the sale of the 
Barn to Golfland independent from the Water Park. (See R. 2 015 
at 1M 98-99). 
17. Thereafter, on multiple occasions, the Liquidator 
indicated expressly and impliedly that it was willing to complete 
the sale of the Barn to Golfland pursuant to the Barn Contract. 
(See id.). 
G. The Liquidator Breaches the Barn Contract 
18. Notwithstanding its obligations and promises to 
Golfland, the Liquidator then proceeded, without Golfland's 
knowledge or consent, to solicit other offers from Provo City, 
and others, in an attempt to obtain more money on the sale of the 
Barn Property. (See R. 2015 at H 101). 
19. Shortly thereafter, the Liquidator received an offer 
from Provo City to purchase the Barn for more money than the 
Golfland purchase price. As a result, the Liquidator determined 
that it would repudiate the Barn Contract with Golfland and offer 
the Barn for sale again to the highest bidder. (See R. 2015-2016 
at UK 101-102). 
20. Accordingly, the Liquidator rebuffed Golfland's attempt 
to complete the sale of the Barn independent from the Water Park. 
(See id.). 
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21. After receiving the higher Provo City offer, the 
Liquidator did an about-face as to the legal and factual issues 
surrounding Golfland's right to purchase the Barn. Thereafter, 
the Liquidator argued for the first time that Golfland had 
defaulted under the Barn Contract and had lost all rights to 
purchase the Barn when it tendered its purchase price in March, 
1994. The Liquidator also argued that, pursuant to the 
Simultaneous Closing Provision and the Timing Provisions, 
Golfland lost all rights to purchase the Barn when the sale 
failed to close on April 8, 1994. These new arguments were 
wholly inconsistent with the conduct and representations of the 
Liquidator in the weeks and months preceding the receipt of the 
Provo City offer. (See R. 2016-2019 at UK 104-113) . 
H. Golfland Prepares a Complaint Against the Liquidator 
22. In July and August, 1994, Golfland prepared a Complaint 
against the Liquidator (the "Proposed Complaint"), asserting that 
the Liquidator was still obligated to sell the Barn to Golfland 
notwithstanding the non-occurrence of conditions precedent. 
Pursuant to the Proposed Complaint, Golfland took the position 
that the Liquidator is liable for specific performance and 
monetary damages for the injuries suffered by Golfland as a 
result of the Liquidator's breach of contract and other tortious 
conduct. (See Proposed Complaint at R. 1789-1814). 
23. Because the Liquidator is protected by the Utah 
Insurance Code and the Order of Liquidation, Golfland felt 
10 
compelled to seek leave of the Lower Court to file its Proposed 
Complaint against the Liquidator.15 (See R. 1779-1781). 
24. On August 11, 1994, Golfland filed a Motion seeking 
leave of Court to file its Proposed Complaint (Golfland's "Motion 
for Leave to File Complaint") . (See id.) . 
25. Shortly thereafter, the Liquidator filed a motion 
seeking Court permission to sell the Barn to Provo City or 
another offeror (The Liquidator's "Motion to Sell Barn"). (See 
R. 1815-1818). 
26. In briefing the two pending Motions, each party 
attached a few documents as exhibits to the memoranda. However, 
neither party attempted to lay a foundation for the exhibits, or 
to otherwise establish the admissibility of such documents. No 
party filed any affidavits in support of their memoranda. No 
discovery was conducted. 
I, The Liquidator's Position in the Court Below 
27. The Liquidator unashamedly opposed Golfland's Motion 
for Leave to File Complaint. Unbelievably, the Liquidator took 
the position that Golfland should not be given a jury trial —or 
any trial -- to adjudicate Golfland's claims against the 
Liquidator. The Liquidator argued that Golfland should not even 
be allowed to file its Complaint. Instead, the Liquidator 
argued, all of Golfland's claims should be resolved by the 
15
 It is uncertain whether Golfland was required to obtain 
leave of Court to file its Complaint. The Utah Insurance Code 
does not appear to apply to situations where, as here, claims are 
brought against the Liquidator for its own post-liquidation 
conduct -- rather than claims brought against the insurance 
company for pre-liquidation conduct. Nevertheless, out of an 
abundance of caution, Golfland decided that it would seek Court 
permission prior to filing its Complaint. 
11 
Liquidation Court pursuant to the Liquidator's Motion to Sell 
Barn. (See R. 1888). 
28. The Liquidator's Motion to Sell Barn consisted of two 
prongs: 
(a) First, the Liquidator requested a Court Order allowing 
the Liquidator to sell the Barn to Provo City or any other 
higher and better offeror notwithstanding the February 22 
Barn Contract with Golfland (the Liquidator's "Primary 
Motion"). 
(b) Second, in the alternative, the Liquidator requested, 
if the Court determined that the Liquidator was obligated to 
sell the Barn to Golfland under the February 22 Barn 
Contract, that the Court enter an Order approving the 
completion of the sale to Golfland (the Liquidator's 
"Alternative Motion"). 
(See R. 1815-1816). 
29. In briefing the two motions, the Liquidator for the 
first time raised its arguments that Golfland lost the right to 
purchase the Barn because of insufficient tender and the failure 
of conditions. (See % 21, supra). 
J. Golfland's Position in the Court Below 
30. Golfland argued in opposition to the Primary Motion and 
in support of the Alternative Motion. (See R. 1985-1986) . 
31. In arguing against the Liquidator's Primary Motion, 
Golfland argued that the Liquidator was bound, under the February 
22 Barn Contract and the February 24 Order, to sell the Barn to 
Golfland. Golfland argued that, even if there was a failure of 
certain conditions and contingencies under the contract, the 
Liquidator could not escape liability, because: (1) the 
Liquidator breached the "best efforts" provision of the Barn 
Contract; (2) the Liquidator, through representations, omissions, 
and other conduct, improperly caused the conditions to fail; and 
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(3) the Liquidator waived the right to enforce such conditions. 
(See R. 2026-2048). 
32. In its memoranda, Golfland argued that the Primary 
Motion could not properly be granted "until after a full jury 
trial on the merits" of Golfland's proposed Complaint was 
conducted. (See R. 2551-2552). 
33. However, in arguing in favor of the Liquidator's 
Alternative Motion, Golfland argued that no additional 
adjudication was necessary to support an Order approving the sale 
of the Barn to Golfland. (See R. 2552-2553) . 
K. The April 17 Hearing 
34. On April 17, 1995, oral argument was held on Golfland's 
Motion for Leave to File Complaint and the Liquidator's Motion to 
Sell Barn. No evidence whatsoever was admitted at the hearing. 
(A copy of the transcript of the April 17, 1995 Hearing is 
attached in the Addendum, at pp. 1-52) . 
35. At the close of the oral argument, the Court granted 
the Liquidator's Primary Motion -- ruling that the Liquidator may 
sell the Barn to another offeror free and clear of Golfland's 
interest. The Court also granted Golfland's Motion for Leave to 
File Complaint -- ruling that Golfland would be permitted to seek 
monetary damages by filing a Complaint against the Liquidator in 
State court. (The transcript of the Court's Ruling is attached 
in the Addendum at pp. 46-52) . 
36. At the hearing, to Golfland's surprise and without a 
request by any party, the Liquidation Judge made specific factual 
findings, as an apparent finder of fact, in support of its ruling 
approving the Liquidator's Primary Motion -- notwithstanding the 
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lack of any admissible evidence before the Court. (See Addendum 
p. 48, 11. 4-16; p. 49, 11. 12-15). 
37. Golfland was particularly surprised when the 
Liquidation Judge made the following finding: 
I do not think this real estate is so unique that 
dollar damages in the event you're successful with 
the complaint would not be satisfactory and 
sufficient. 
(See Addendum, p.49, 11. 12-15). The Liquidator made this 
finding notwithstanding the fact that the parties had presented 
no evidence, documentation, or argument whatsoever as to this 
issue. This finding was apparently based upon the Liquidation 
Judge's personal experience with the Barn. Immediately prior to 
making this finding, the Liquidation Judge noted: "I think I 
foreclosed on this same property once back in the late 70's . . . 
(See Addendum p. 49, 11. 8-10). 
L. The Barn Litigation 
38. Pursuant to the Court's Order, Golfland filed its 
Complaint against the Liquidator in State Court on June 22, 1995, 
Case No. 950904413CV (the "Barn Litigation"). 
39. On July 31, 1995, the Liquidator filed a motion to 
dismiss the Barn Litigation. Notwithstanding the Lower Court's 
Order allowing Golfland to seek monetary damages by filing its 
Complaint, the Liquidator argues that the Lower Court's ruling at 
the April 17 Hearing operates as full adjudication of all of the 
claims raised in Golfland's Complaint and, under the doctrines of 
res judicata, precludes the Barn Litigation in its entirety. 
(See Liquidator's Memorandum in Support of Motion to Dismiss 
Complaint, at pp. 6-17 (attached as Exhibit "H" to Golfland's 
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Memorandum in Opposition to Appellee's Motion for Summary 
Disposition, filed in this Appeal on October 9, 1997) ). 1 6 
40. In other words, the Liquidator asserts that Golfland 
has no right to a jury trial on any of its claims -- whether for 
specific performance or monetary damages. Instead, the 
Liquidator asserts, all of Golfland's claims were adjudicated by 
the Judge pursuant to oral argument at the April 17 Hearing. 
(See id.). 
M. The July 7 Order 
41. After the April 17 Hearing, a dispute arose as to the 
form of the Court Order granting the Liquidator's Motion to Sell 
Barn. Specifically, the parties disputed whether the Court's 
ruling was based upon an evidentiary record. (See R. 2933-2958; 
2959-2993; 3062-3072). 
42. Ultimately, on July 7, 1995, the Court entered the July 
7 Order granting the Liquidator's Primary Motion. (See Addendum, 
at pp. 53-58). 
43. The July 7 Order contained the following language: "No 
evidence was taken at the hearing; evidence was submitted with 
the pleadings." (See R. 3132). 
N. The Present Appeal 
44. After the July 7 Order was certified as final, Golfland 
appealed the July 7 Order by initiating the present appeal with 
the Utah Supreme Court. 
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 Although the Liquidator filed its Motion to Dismiss on 
July 31, 1995, Judge Henriod has not yet issued a ruling on the 
Liquidator's Motion. 
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45. On October 8, 1997, the Utah Supreme Court assigned the 
appeal to the Utah Court of Appeals. 
46. Pursuant to Golfland's appeal, Golfland filed a 
Docketing Statement listing several separate issues on appeal. 
(See Docketing Statement, at pp. 5-8). 
47. Thereafter, the Liquidator filed a Motion for Summary 
Disposition arguing that Golfland had failed to raise the issues 
on appeal in the Lower Court. 
48. Golfland filed a memorandum in opposition to the 
Liquidator's Motion. Golfland's memorandum pinpointed specific 
cites in the record where Golfland had raised each of the 
arguments below. 
49. On October 23, 1997, the Utah Court of Appeals issued 
an Order denying the Liquidator's Motion for Summary Disposition. 
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT 
On February 22, 1994, Golfland and the Liquidator entered a 
contract for the purchase of the Barn. Thereafter, the 
Liquidator breached its contractual obligation toward Golfland 
and attempted to sell the Barn to Provo City for more money. 
When Golfland prepared a Complaint against the Liquidator for 
breach of contract, the Liquidator attempted to use his status as 
a state insurance liquidator to deprive Golfland of its right to 
a trial on the contract claims. Specifically, the Liquidator has 
taken the position that the Liquidation Court should not permit 
Golfland to file its Complaint and that the Court should 
adjudicate Golfland's claims itself without allowing a trial or 
evidentiary hearing. 
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The Lower Court erred when it granted the Liquidator's 
motion to sell the Barn to Provo City. First, the Court's July 7 
Order is internally inconsistent. The factual findings in the 
Order cannot be reconciled with the Court's ruling -- unless most 
of the factual findings are considered to be dicta. 
Second, the Lower Court committed serious procedural errors 
because: (1) the Court adjudicated factual issues itself rather 
than allowing a jury to make factual determinations; (2) there 
was no admissible evidence upon which factual findings could be 
based; and (3) the Court failed to give Golfland an opportunity 
to present its evidence at a trial or evidentiary hearing. 
Third, the Lower Court's findings are contrary to law and 
are not supported by the evidence in the record (if any). 
Specifically, the Court's finding that the Barn is not "unique" 
so as to justify a claim for specific performance is not 
supported by any evidence whatsoever and is contrary to Utah 
property law. Next, the Court's finding that the February 24 
Order is invalid is contrary to substantial case law protecting 
the validity of judicial sales. Finally, the Court's ruling that 
the Barn Contract is not enforceable because of the failure of 
conditions is erroneous because the Liquidator caused the 
conditions to fail and/or because the Liquidator waived the right 
to enforce such conditions. 
ARGUMENT 
I. The Lower Courts Ruling is Inconsistent and Fundamentally 
Flawed 
The Lower Court's Ruling can be interpreted in two different 
ways: 
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Interpretation No. 1: Complete Adjudication of All Claims. 
Under this interpretation, it is argued that the Lower 
Court intended to adjudicate all claims arising out of the 
Barn Contract. That is, that the Court in essence sat as 
judge and jury -- as if a trial had been held -- and 
adjudicated the entire dispute, including claims for 
monetary damages and specific performance. 
Interpretation No. 2: Adjudication of the "Specific 
Performance Claim" Only. 
Under this interpretation, it is argued that the Lower 
Court's ruling was limited to a denial of Golfland's 
specific performance claim. That is, the Court found that 
the Barn could be sold to a third-party purchaser and that 
Golfland had no right to actual possession or ownership of 
the real estate. As to the remaining issues in Golfland's 
Complaint, however, the Court made no adjudication. Rather 
the Court specifically provided that Golfland may file its 
Complaint and pursue its claims for monetary damages against 
the Liquidator.17 
At times in the past, the Liquidator has taken inconsistent 
positions with respect to the proper interpretation --
alternating arguments in favor of both interpretations. 
Originally, in the Court below, the Liquidator argued in 
favor of Interpretation No. 1. In its initial memorandum, the 
Liquidator argued: 
Resolution of the Liquidator's Motion resolves all 
of Golfland's proposed claims against the 
Liquidator. Therefore there is no need to grant 
relief to allow the filing of such a lawsuit. 
(R. 1888). Thus, the Liquidator originally took the position 
that the Court could render complete adjudication as to all 
claims without allowing Golfland's Proposed Complaint to be 
filed. 
17
 Under this interpretation, the Court's actions were 
similar to that of a Bankruptcy Court, which allows that property 
be sold pending a dispute between parties. The property is 
allowed to be sold to a third-party purchaser free and clear of 
liens and interests. The claimant's rights in the property, if 
any, attach to the proceeds of the sale. 
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Later, however, the Liquidator argued that its motion was 
limited to the issue of specific performance only: 
The sole issue before this court is whether to 
require [the Liquidator] to proceed with the sale 
of [the Barn] . . . [to Golfland] or to approve 
the sale of the SAIC Barn to a higher and better 
offeror. 
See Liquidator's October 4, 1994 Reply Memorandum in Support of 
Motion to Sell Barn, at p. 1 (emphasis added). 
More recently, the Liquidator has switched positions again 
and argues that the April 17 ruling was intended to be a complete 
adjudication of all claims arising out of the Barn contract --
including claims for monetary damages. (See %% 39-40, supra). 
There are significant problems and inconsistencies with the 
Liquidator's "all claims adjudicated" interpretation 
(Interpretation No. 1). A review of the Court's Ruling at the 
April 17 Hearing reveals that the Court did not intend, and could 
not have intended, that its Ruling be a complete adjudication of 
the claims asserted in Golfland's Proposed Complaint. 
Immediately after granting the Liquidator's Primary Motion to 
sell the Barn to Provo City, the Court granted Golfland's motion 
for leave to file the Proposed Complaint against the Liquidator. 
Furthermore, the Court specifically noted that Golfland would be 
allowed to pursue its claims for monetary damages against the 
Liquidator. (See Addendum, at p. 49, 11.12-16). 
These actions are wholly inconsistent with an intent to 
adjudicate all of the claims contained in Golfland's Complaint. 
If the Court intended that its ruling be a complete adjudication, 
why did it grant Golfland's Motion for Leave to File the 
Complaint? Why did it specifically say that Golfland would be 
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allowed to pursue a claim for monetary damages against the 
Liquidator? Clearly, the Court's action in this regard suggests 
that no complete adjudication was intended. 
There are other problems with the "complete adjudication" 
interpretation as well. Such an interpretation would deprive 
Golfland of its constitutional right to due process and a jury 
trial on its entire Complaint. One of the primary purposes for 
the April 17 Hearing was for the Court to consider Golfland's 
motion and determine whether Golfland would be granted leave to 
file its Proposed Complaint against the Liquidator. In such 
circumstances, it would be procedurally and constitutionally 
improper for the Court to attempt to adjudicate the entire 
Complaint in that setting. Did the Court really intend that --
in connection with a short oral argument -- it would adjudicate 
the entire Complaint thus obviating the need for filing of the 
Complaint? Did the Court intend to do away with the ordinary 
litigation process -- including the filing of pleadings, the 
discovery process, and trial? 
Clearly, the answer to these questions is no. The Lower 
Court did not intend, and could not have intended, that its 
ruling be a complete adjudication of the claims contained in 
Golfland's Complaint. Interpretation No. 1 simply does not make 
sense. It is fatally flawed because of irreconcilable internal 
inconsistencies. 
Admittedly, there are problems with the "specific 
performance only" interpretation (Interpretation No. 2). 
Specifically, if the Court intended to rule solely on the issue 
of specific performance, why was it necessary to make factual 
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findings as to the enforceability of the contract? Why did the 
Court make factual findings as to the failure of conditions 
precedent and the sufficiency of Golfland's tender? Such 
findings would not be necessary to adjudicate the simple question 
of specific performance. 
Despite its problems, Interpretation No. 2 suffers from 
substantially fewer deficiencies than Interpretation No. 1. This 
interpretation is the only way to reconcile the Court's 
simultaneous granting of Golfland's Motion for Leave to File the 
Complaint and the Court's statement that Golfland would be 
allowed to pursue its claim for monetary damages. Furthermore, 
this interpretation lessens the impact of the serious 
constitutional and procedural concerns in the Court below. 
Moreover, if those factual findings which are not necessary to 
the Court's Ruling are considered to be dicta,18 there are no 
internal inconsistencies in this interpretation. 
Regardless of the interpretation employed by the Court, 
Golfland submits that the July 7 Order is erroneous as a matter 
of fact and law.19 Nevertheless, should this Court be inclined 
to uphold the July 7 Order, it should clarify that the Order is 
18
 See n.23, infra. 
19
 Under either interpretation, the July 7 Order is 
deficient because of procedural errors. See Part II, infra. 
Specifically, the Order violated Golfland's constitutional rights 
to due process and a jury trial. Furthermore, Interpretation No. 
1 is erroneous because it is based upon flawed legal and factual 
findings as to the failure of conditions precedent, the 
sufficiency of Golfland's tender, and the validity of the 
February 24 Order. (See Part III, infra). Interpretation No. 2 
is erroneous because it is based upon clearly erroneous legal and 
factual findings as to the "uniqueness" of the Barn property. 
(See Part III.A., infra). 
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limited to the issue of specific performance and that it does not 
purport to adjudicate any issues relevant to Golfland's claim for 
monetary damages in the Barn Litigation. 
II. Procedural Errors 
The most glaring errors committed by the Lower Court were 
procedural. As a result of these errors, Golfland has been 
deprived of its constitutional rights to due process and a jury 
trial. Indeed, Golfland has been deprived of the right to any 
trial -- or even an evidentiary hearing. Instead, the Lower 
Court purported to adjudicate Golfland's rights on its own, based 
solely upon the oral argument of counsel and a few exhibits which 
were attached (not in admissible form) to the memoranda. 
A* Background 
At the April 17 Hearing, the Cower Court considered three 
(3) separate motions: 
1. Golfland's Motion for Leave to File Complaint; 
2. The Liquidator's Primary Motion seeking leave of the 
Court to sell the Barn to Provo City; and 
3. The Liquidator's Alternative Motion seeking leave of 
the Court to complete the sale of the Barn to Golfland. 
The resolution of the first and third motions did not 
require an evidentiary hearing or any admissible evidence 
whatsoever. Golfland's Motion for Leave to File Complaint was 
essentially a precautionary motion to avoid violating any stay 
which may be in place as to lawsuits against the Liquidator. 
Golfland was not seeking any dispositive ruling on the issues 
raised in the Complaint, but just the right to file the Complaint 
to initiate the process of a determination of the Liquidator's 
liability for post-liquidation conduct. It was not necessary or 
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appropriate for the Court to conduct a trial or to consider 
evidence in order to grant Golfland's motion. 
Similarly, with respect to the Liquidator's Alternative 
Motion to sell the Barn to Golfland, no evidence was necessary. 
The Liquidation Court had previously entered the February 24 
Order approving the sale of the Barn to Golfland. The Lower 
Court could certainly enforce that Order, without requiring an 
evidentiary hearing, by simply modifying the specific closing 
provisions. 
With respect to the Liquidator's Primary Motion (seeking 
leave to sell the barn to Provo City), however, a full 
evidentiary trial was absolutely critical. Because the sale to 
Provo City would necessitate a vacation of the February 24 Order 
approving the sale to Golfland, and because it would require an 
adjudication of the specific performance claim contained in 
Golfland's Proposed Complaint, the Primary Motion could not 
properly be granted absent a full jury trial on the merits of 
Golfland's breach of contract claim.20 
In its Ruling, the Court committed gross procedural error 
because it purported to grant the Primary Motion without giving 
Golfland the benefit of a trial. 
20
 Thus, in its memorandum, Golfland argued the following: 
[T]he sale to Provo City cannot be approved 
absent full adjudication of the rights of the 
parties under the contract for the sale of 
the barn property to Golfland. . . . This 
court cannot approve the sale to Provo City 
until after a full jury trial on the merits 
has been conducted. 
(See R. 2552-52 (emphasis added)). 
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B. The Lower Court Usurped the Role of the Jury by Acting 
as the Finder-of-Fact 
Ordinarily, when a seller breaches a contract for the sale 
of real property, the would-be purchaser is entitled to file a 
Complaint against the seller for breach of contract -- seeking 
both damages and specific performance. In such a situation, 
pursuant to the Constitutions of the United States and Utah, the 
purchaser has the right to have its claims resolved by a jury of 
its peers, rather than the Court. 
In the present case, Golfland was deprived of this 
constitutional right. Instead, the Court usurped the jury's role 
and, at the conclusion of oral argument, made specific findings 
of fact — as if the Court, rather than the jury, were the proper 
adjudicator of such facts. 
The Court's actions in this respect are erroneous on their 
face. Nowhere is the Court authorized to act as the finder-of-
fact on a claim for breach of contract. The fact that this case 
involves the liquidation of an insurance company does not alter 
this analysis. The Utah Insurance Code does not, and cannot, 
subvert the plaintiff's constitutional right to a jury trial. 
For this reason alone, the Order of the Lower Court should 
be reversed and remanded with instructions that Golfland be given 
a jury trial on the question whether the Liquidator is obligated 
to complete the sale of the Barn to Golfland. 
C. The Lower Court Erred in Finding that "Evidence was 
Submitted with the Pleadings," 
At the conclusion of oral argument, the Lower Court made 
specific factual findings -- as if the court had just sat through 
a trial or an evidentiary hearing. Such findings were surprising 
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in light of the fact that there had been no trial or evidentiary 
hearing and there was no admissible evidence upon which factual 
findings could be based. 
Later, when the this clear deficiency was brought to the 
Liquidator's attention, the Liquidator insisted that the 
following sentence be added to its Second Proposed Order: 
fl[E]vidence was submitted with the pleadings."21 This language 
was included in the July 7 Order. (See R. 3132). 
This sentence is inaccurate, misleading, and erroneous as a 
matter of law. In the proceedings below, no party submitted or 
even attempted to submit any admissible evidence to the Court. 
Although the parties attached a few documents as exhibits to 
their memoranda, none of the exhibits was supported by any 
affidavit or otherwise submitted in admissible form. 
Because it cannot be reasonably disputed that there was no 
admissible evidence attached to the memoranda, the Lower Court's 
July 7 Order is clearly erroneous and should be reversed. 
D5 The Lower Court Erred in Failing to Provide Golfland 
with a Trial --or Even an Evidentiary Hearing --in 
Which to Litigate its Claims Against the Liquidator 
Not only was Golfland deprived of a jury, it was deprived of 
its right to a trial altogether. Indeed, the Lower Court did not 
21
 The Liquidator included this language in an after-the-
fact attempt to salvage the Lower Court's blatant procedural 
error. Because it could not be disputed that there was no trial 
or evidentiary hearing to support factual findings, the 
Liquidator for the first time took the position that the 
documents attached as exhibits to the memoranda were evidence 
upon which the findings were based. Prior to this time, neither 
the Court nor any party had ever indicated that the exhibits were 
to be considered as "evidence." 
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even allow Golfland an evidentiary hearing in which to assert its 
claims against the Liquidator. 
It is undisputed that in the proceedings below, the court 
held no trial. It is undisputed that the court held no 
evidentiary hearing. Rather, the only hearing that was held was 
one for the oral argument of counsel on the two pending motions. 
It is undisputed that no evidence was submitted at this 
hearing.22 Golfland was not allowed to opportunity to examine, 
or cross-examine any witnesses. 
Thus, even if admissible evidence were submitted with the 
pleadings, there is no denying the fact that Golfland was denied 
the opportunity to present its evidence at a trial or evidentiary 
hearing. 
Ill, Substantive Errors 
The July 7 Order should be reversed because it is based upon 
erroneous legal conclusions and factual findings. Such errors 
are independent from the Court's procedural errors. Thus, even 
if there were admissible evidence in the record, the Court's 
finding are erroneous because they are not supported by such 
evidence. Indeed, for purposes of Part III of this Brief, it may 
be assumed that all of the documents attached as exhibits to the 
memoranda are admissible evidence upon which the Court could rely 
in making factual findings. As shown below, such evidence is 
wholly insufficient to support the Court's factual findings. 
At the close of the April 17 Hearing, the Lower Court ruled 
from the bench making several findings of fact. These findings 
22
 Indeed, the July 7 Order itself states that: "No evidence 
was taken at the hearing . . . ." (See Addendum, at p. 54). 
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were later incorporated into six separate factual findings in the 
Court's written July 7 Order. (See July 7 Order, R. 3132-3133 at 
M 2-7) . This brief will discuss each of these findings in turn. 
A. The "Uniqueness" of the Barn 
The Lower Court's most glaring factual error is its finding 
that : 
The SAIC Barn is not so unique that dollar damages 
in the event that Golfland is successful in its 
complaint against the Liquidation Estate would not 
be satisfactory and sufficient. 
(See R. 3133 at % 7), 2 3 This finding is clearly erroneous 
because there is absolutely nothing in the record which would 
support such a finding. The record contains no documentation, 
memoranda, or argument of counsel as to this issue. The question 
whether the Barn is "unique" so as to justify a claim for 
specific performance was not raised whatsoever in the proceedings 
before the Lower Court. Rather, the Lower Court sua sponte 
raised the issue in its Ruling at the April 17 Hearing. 
The Lower Court's finding is apparently based upon Judge 
Henriod's own prior experience with the property. Immediately 
prior to making the finding, the Judge commented that he had 
23
 Of the Lower Court's six findings, this finding is the 
only one necessary to the Court's Ruling. Indeed, the Court's 
Ruling -- that the Liquidator would be allowed to sell the Barn 
free from Golfland's specific performance claim --is based 
directly upon the finding that the Barn is not unique and does 
not justify a claim for specific performance. 
The other five findings made by the Court are inconsistent 
with the Court's Ruling that Golfland would be allowed to pursue 
its claim for monetary damages against the Liquidator. Thus, if 
the Lower Court intended to limit its Ruling to Golfland's 
specific performance claim (see Interpretation No. 2, supra), 
then the remaining five findings are dicta and need not be 
considered by this Court. 
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foreclosed on the same property in the 1970's. Specifically, the 
Judge stated: 
I think I foreclosed on this same property once back in 
the late '70's, so go ahead and conduct your sale. I 
am also going to grant Golfland's motion, though, to 
file a complaint, and I do not think that this real 
estate is so unique that dollar damages in the event 
that you're successful with the complaint would not be 
satisfactory and sufficient. 
(Addendum, p.49, 11. 8-15). 
Because of the utter lack of evidence or argument as to 
whether the real property is "unique," the Judge's sua sponte 
finding as to this issue must have been based upon his own 
personal experience with the Barn property. As a matter of law, 
this is an insufficient basis for a factual finding. The Judge's 
alleged personal experience is, on its face, an improper basis 
for making a factual finding on the record.24 
Furthermore, the Court's finding is contrary to the true 
facts of this case. Although such facts are not in the record, 
Golfland submits that the true evidence would show that, based on 
the architecture, location, and other aspects of the Barn, the 
Barn property with its improvements is extremely unique. 
Golfland is uncertain as to the condition of the real property 
when Judge Henriod foreclosed on it in the 1970's. At the 
present, however, the real property contains a successful office 
building with a unique location at the foot of a majestic 
mountain and adjacent to two major recreational attractions. 
24
 It is impossible to "marshal the evidence" in support of 
this finding because there was absolutely no evidence in the 
record whatsoever upon which such a finding could be made. 
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Moreover, regardless of the factual record, the Court's 
finding that the Barn is not "unique" is contrary to law. 
Pursuant to relevant law, all real estate is "unique" so as to 
qualify for specific performance. Under Utah law, specific 
performance is a valid remedy for breach of a contract for the 
sale of land. (See Kelley v. Leucadia Financial Corp., 846 P.2d 
1238, 1242 (Utah 1992) ("Specific performance with an abatement 
in purchase price has long been recognized as an appropriate 
remedy when the seller refuses to convey")). The law does not 
provide for a case-by-case, factual determination as to whether a 
given parcel of real estate is unique. Rather, the law presumes 
that all real property is unique. By its very nature, real 
property is unique so as to justify specific performance. See 
Perron v. Hale, 701 P.2d 198, 202 (Idaho 1985) ("because of the 
perceived uniqueness of land, it is presumed that damages are 
inadequate in an action for breach of a land sale contract"). 
See also Barker v. Francis, 741 P.2d 548, 553 (Utah App. 1987); 
Castaano v. Church, 552 P.2d 1282, 1284 (Utah 1976). 
Thus, in the present case, it was neither necessary nor 
proper for the Lower Court to make a factual finding as to the 
uniqueness of the Barn. Under Utah law, the Court should have 
deemed the property to be unique, sufficient to allow Golfland to 
pursue its claim for specific performance on the Barn Contract. 
B. The Validity of Judge Stirba's February 24 Order 
In its fifth factual finding, the Lower Court found: 
Judge Stirba's February 24 1994, Order authorizing the 
sale of the SAIC Barn to Golfland is ineffective 
because the terms of sale that Judge Stirba approved in 
her Order were not the terms of the sale that was 
frustrated by the Bankruptcy Court Order. 
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R. 3133 at H 6.25 
The Lower Court's casual disregard for Judge Stirba's prior 
court Order approving the sale to Golfland exhibits a complete 
misunderstanding of the strict legal standard governing the 
validity of a confirmed judicial sale. The Lower Court has 
failed to acknowledge that confirmed judicial sales should not be 
set aside lightly. The law provides that a confirmed judicial 
sale is entitled to special judicial protection. In order to 
protect the sanctity of the judicial sale process, courts will 
not allow a confirmed judicial sale to be disturbed absent 
egregious misconduct. Courts apply a strict legal standard in 
order to protect purchasers at judicial sales. Application of 
the strict standard is designed to prevent situations (as in the 
present case) where the seller is able to revoke the sale in 
order to gain more money from a subsequent offeror. 
The Utah Supreme Court has explained that: "The policy of 
the courts is to uphold judicial sales except when they are 
manifestly unfair." Mower v. Bohmke, 337 P.2d 429, 431 (Utah 
1959) (emphasis added). 
Numerous courts throughout the United States have applied a 
strict legal standard in determining whether to disturb the 
integrity of judicial sales. Many courts require that there be 
sufficient misconduct to "shock the conscience" of the Court. 
25
 As discussed in n.23, supra, this finding (as well as all 
remaining findings) is not necessary for the Court's Ruling that 
the Liquidator is permitted to sell the Barn free from Golfland7s 
specific performance claim. Accordingly, if this Court rules 
that the July 7 Order adjudicates the specific performance claim 
only (see Interpretation No. 2, supra), then this finding is 
dicta and need not be considered by this Court. 
30 
Such courts have explained that in the bankruptcy and liquidation 
estate context, the standard for setting aside a previous Order 
confirming a sale is much stricter than the standard for 
evaluating a proposed sale for approval. See In re WPRV-TV, 
Inc., 983 F.2d 336, 340-41 (1st Cir. 1993); Matter of Chung King, 
Inc., 753 F.2d 547, 550 (7th Cir. 1985); In re Transcontinental 
Energy Corp., 683 F.2d 326, 328 (9th Cir. 1982); In re Webcor, 
392 F.2d 893, 899 (7th Cir.), cert, denied. Silver, Inc. v. 
Webcor, Inc., 393 U.S. 837 (1968); In re Furst, 57 B.R. 1013, 
1016 (E.D. Pa. 1986); In re Lamont, 453 F. Supp. 608, 609-10 
(N.D.N.Y. 1978), aff'd, 603 F.2d 213 (2d Cir. 1979); In re 
Homestead Industries, Inc., 138 B.R. 788, 790 (Bankr. W.D. Pa. 
1992); In re University Avenue Properties, 55 B.R. 986, 989 
(Bankr. E.D. Wis. 1986). In determining whether to approve a 
proposed sale, the primary focus is to obtain the highest price 
for the liquidation estate. When evaluating a previously 
approved sale, on the other hand, the primary focus is the need 
for finality and protection of the integrity of the judicial sale 
process. See University Avenue Properties, 555 B.R. at 989. "If 
parties are to be encouraged to bid at judicial sales there must 
be stability in such sales and the time must come when a fair bid 
is accepted and the proceedings are ended." Webcor, 392 F.2d at 
899. 
Because of the need for finality and integrity in the 
judicial sales procedure, courts may not set aside a previously-
approved judicial sale "unless 'compelling equities' outweigh the 
interests in finality." Chung King, 753 F.2d at 550 (citing 
Transcontinental Energy, 683 F.2d at 328). There must be 
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egregious fraud, unfairness or mistake. There must be a 
"fundamental defect. f'26 Homestead Industries, 138 B.R. at 790. 
See also Lamont, 453 F. Supp. at 609-10; University Avenue 
Properties, 55 B.R. at 989; Chung King, 753 F.2d at 550; 
Homestead Industries, 138 B.R. at 790.27 
Accordingly, courts in liquidation proceedings have very 
little discretion in determining whether to set aside a 
previously approved sale. " [T]he decision of the court to set 
aside a confirmed judicial sale in bankruptcy is an extraordinary 
one to be exercised only in very limited circumstances." 
University Avenue Properties, 55 B.R. at 989. See also Homestead 
Industries, 13 8 B.R. at 790 ("Bankruptcy courts are loath to 
tamper with a confirmed sale of estate property"); WPRV-TV, 983 
F.2d at 34 0 (Courts have a "relatively narrow range of 
discretion" and may "vacate a prior order confirming a sale only 
in very limited circumstances"); Transcontinental Energy, 638 
F.2d at 328 (Courts "are especially hesitant to set aside 
26This standard applies whether the previously-approved sale 
is challenged on appeal to a higher court, see WPRV-TV, 983 F.2d 
at 340-41; Furst, 57 B.R. at 1013, or on a motion to set aside 
raised before the same court which approved the sale. See 
Homestead Industries. 138 B.R. at 788; University Avenue 
Properties, 55 B.R. at 986. 
27
 In a recent ruling, the Tenth Circuit Court of Appeals 
applied a much less stringent standard in determining whether an 
approved judicial sale should be vacated. In In re BCD Corp. 
(Golfland Entertainment Centers, Inc. v. Peak Investment, Inc.), 
119 F.3d 852 (10th Cir. 1997), where Golfland appealed the 
Bankruptcy Court's vacation of an Order approving the sale of the 
Water Park (which was to be sold in conjunction with the Barn), 
the Tenth Circuit ruled that a judicial sale may be vacated based 
upon mere mistake. See id. at 860-62. This lenient standard 
appears to be contrary to the great weight of authority from 
other jurisdictions which provide a strict legal standard for 
disturbing approved sales. 
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confirmed bankruptcy sales"); Chung King, 753 F.2d at 550 
("[T]he court's range of discretion on this matter is quite 
narrow") .28 
In the present case, the Liquidator is wholly unable to meet 
the standard required to set aside Judge Stirba's previous 
approval of the sale. None of the facts alleged, even if true, 
approach the degree of egregiousness required to set aside the 
Court's approval. None of the facts establish "manifest 
unfairness." 
The Lower Court's disregard of the previously approved 
February 24 Order undermines the integrity of the judicial sale 
process. Golfland was a good faith third-party bidder at the 
28
 It is important to note that the receipt of a higher 
offer for the estate's assets, and the potential to gain more 
money for the estate, is not a valid factor to consider in 
setting aside a sale. Unless the initial sales price is so 
"grossly inadequate as to shock the conscience of the court," 
Chung King, 753 F.2d at 550, a subsequent higher offer, even if 
substantially higher, will not disturb the finality of the sale. 
Id. 
Setting aside a sale, which had already been 
confirmed by the bankruptcy judge, on the ground 
that a better price for the real estate could be 
obtained, would make a mockery of the hearing 
conducted by the bankruptcy judge . . . . 
In re Furst, 57 B.R. 1013, 1016 (E.D. Pa. 1986). Although a 
subsequent higher offer might provide extra money to the 
liquidation estate in the present case, the allowance of such an 
offer would destroy confidence in the integrity of the judicial 
sale. "[I]n the long run such a practice would be penny wise and 
pound foolish. Creditors in general would suffer if 
unpredictability discouraged bidders altogether. At the least 
such practices might encourage low formal bids." In re Gil-Bern 
Industries, Inc., 526 F.2d 627, 629 (1st Cir. 1975). 
In the present case, there can be no allegation that the 
sales price is inadequate. Golfland's offer was the highest and 
best offer submitted at the auction. Provo City's subsequent 
offer, over six months later, was not significantly higher than 
the Golfland sales price. Thus, there is simply no basis to 
disturb the finality of the sale. 
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February 22 auction. It purchased the Barn in the good faith 
belief that the integrity of the judicial sale would be protected 
by the court. Golfland's expectation was undermined by the 
conduct of the Liquidator. The Liquidator first engaged in 
conduct which caused the failure of the sale to close at the 
scheduled time. Thereafter, the Liquidator led Golfland to 
believe that the sale would be completed notwithstanding the 
failure to close on April 8, 1994. Golfland continued to pursue 
its rights in the Barn based upon such representations. It was 
not until the Liquidator received an offer for more money that 
the Liquidator suddenly changed its position and tried to back 
out of its contractual obligations to Golfland. 
If the Liquidator is successful in its attempt to repudiate 
the contract, the integrity of all judicial sales will be 
undermined. Potential purchasers will not be willing to bid as 
much money - or to bid at all --at such sales if they know they 
are subject to lose the entire sale if the seller obtains a 
subsequent higher offer for the property. 
In order to protect the judicial sale process, the Court 
must give more deference to the initial sales process. Mere 
difficulties or irregularities should not be enough to disturb 
the sale. Similarly, the seller may not be allowed to repudiate 
the sale as soon as a higher offer is obtained. 
In the present case, this Court must give deference to Judge 
Stirba's February 24 Order approving the sale to Golfland. The 
February Order should not be disturbed absent a showing that 
Golfland engaged in egregious conduct resulting in manifest 
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unfairness.29 Because the Lower Court failed to consider the 
proper legal standard in determining whether to invalidate the 
February 24 Order, the Court's July 7 Order should be reversed. 
C. The Failure of Conditions Precedent 
In the July 7 Order, the Lower Court found that the Barn 
Contract was "contingent upon conditions which never occurred." 
See July 7 Order, R. 3132 at 1 2. Golfland concedes that certain 
conditions in the Barn Contract did not occur. Specifically, 
Golfland does not dispute that the Simultaneous Closing Provision 
was not met, or that the sale did not close with the time 
required by the Timing Provisions. 
Thus, on its face, the language of this factual finding is 
not erroneous. Nevertheless, Golfland submits that, 
notwithstanding the failure of these conditions, the Liquidator 
has not been absolved of its contractual obligations toward 
Golfland. 
Utah law provides two independent bases for enforcing a 
contract notwithstanding the failure of conditions precedent. 
Both of these bases are relevant in the present case. First, the 
law provides that a party who is responsible for the failure of a 
condition may not escape liability based upon such failure. 
Second, the law provides that where a party waives a condition, 
the contract may be enforced despite the failure of such 
condition. 
29
 Obviously, the sale should not be set aside if the 
Liquidator's conduct is found to result in manifest unfairness. 
The Liquidator should not benefit from its own egregious conduct. 
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1. A Party Who Causes the Failure of a Condition Precedent 
May Not Escape Contractual Liability Based Upon the 
Failure of Such Condition. 
In the present case, the Liquidator was under a duty to see 
that the conditions to the Barn Contract came to fruition. The 
Liquidator was under both (1) an affirmative duty to see that the 
conditions precedent were fulfilled; and/or (2) a negative duty 
to refrain from interfering with the fulfillment of any condition 
precedent. 
These duties arise out of contract and law. 
First, the duty is found, expressly and impliedly, in the 
Barn Contract. The Barn Contract contains an express provision 
which impose a duty upon the Liquidator to pursue diligently and 
to use its best efforts to satisfy the fulfillment of the 
conditions to closing. (See H 7, supra). 
Similarly, the Liquidator executed a supplemental Barn 
Contract on April 8, 1994, wherein it warranted that the sales 
transactions had been approved by the appropriate courts. (See 
R. 2033 at n.3). 
Next, even where the contract imposes no duty with respect 
to the fulfillment of conditions precedent, such a duty may be 
imposed by law. The Court may impose a duty to make "reasonable 
efforts" to satisfy the condition, to act in good faith to 
satisfy the condition, or simply to refrain from conduct which 
would prevent the fulfillment of the condition. 
Where a contract is conditioned upon the approval of a third 
party (for example, a title company, a bank, or a Court) the law 
will require that the parties act in good faith and make 
reasonable efforts to obtain such approval -- even if the 
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contract itself imposes no such duties. This concept is 
explained in the Restatement of Contracts: 
A contracts to sell and B to buy a house for $50,000, 
with the provision, "this contract is conditional on 
approval by X bank of B's pending mortgage 
applications." Approval by X bank is a condition of 
B's duty. B is under no duty that the X bank approve 
his application, but a Court will supply a term 
imposing on him a duty to make reasonable efforts to 
obtain approval. 
Restatement (Second) of Contracts, §225, Illustration 8 (citing 
Id. at §§ 204, 205) (emphasis added).30 
Furthermore, Section 2 05 of the Restatement imposes a duty 
of good faith and fair dealing in all contracts. This duty has 
been clearly recognized under Utah law. "[E]very contract 
includes a covenant of good faith with respect to dealings 
between the parties. The parties to a contract must deal fairly 
and honestly with each other." Rio Algom Corp. v. Jimco Ltd., 
618 P.2d 497, 505 (Utah 1980) (emphasis added). 
At the very minimum, the Liquidator was under a duty to 
refrain from conduct which would cause the conditions to fail. 
Pursuant to the implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing, 
"each party impliedly promises that he will not intentionally or 
purposely do anything which will destroy or injure the other 
party's right to receive the fruits of the contract." St. 
Benedict's Development Co. v. St. Benedict's Hospital, 811 P.2d 
194, 199 (Utah 1991). 
30
 Courts will not impose a duty to obtain approval where 
neither party has control over the approval process, and neither 
party is at fault for the failure to obtain approval. See Welch 
Transfer & Storage, Inc. v. Oldham, 663 P.2d 73, 76 (Utah 1983). 
Nevertheless, at the very minimum, Courts will impose a duty to 
not act so as to hinder or interfere with the fulfillment of a 
condition precedent. 
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A fundamental aspect of Utah contracts law is that "one 
party may not render it difficult or impossible for the other to 
continue performance and then take advantage of the non-
performance he has caused." Zion's Properties, Inc. v. Holt, 538 
P.2d 1319, 1321 (Utah 1975). 
When a contract is dependent upon the occurrence of certain 
conditions, each party is "legally bound not to frustrate the 
fulfillment of those conditions, especially where their non-
occurrence would benefit" that party. Bastian v. Cedar Hills 
Investment & Land Co., 632 P.2d 818, 821 (Utah 1981). A party 
which causes the failure of the condition precedent injures the 
other party's right to receive the fruits of the contract. Such 
acts are a breach of the implied covenant of good faith and fair 
dealing and are actionable for breach of contract. 
Clearly, a party who causes the failure of a condition 
precedent may not rely upon that failure to excuse its 
performance under the contract. 
Where a contract is performable on the occurrence of a 
future event, there is an implied agreement that the 
promisor will place no obstacle in the way of the 
happening of such event, particularly where it is 
dependent in whole or in part on his own act; and where 
he prevents the fulfillment of a condition precedent or 
its performance by the adverse party, he cannot rely on 
such condition to defeat his liability. 
Dohanvos v. Prudential Insurance Co., 952 F.2d 947, 951 (6th Cir. 
1992) (quoting 13 C.J. §722, at 648) (emphasis added). See also 
In re LCS Homes, Inc. 103 B.R. 736, 743-44 (Bankr. E.D. Va. 1989) 
("a party to a contract is under a duty not to prevent 
performance by the other party"); Gatoil (U.S.A.), Inc. v. 
Washington Metropolitan Area Transit Authority. 801 F.2d 451, 456 
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(D.C. Cir. 1986) (a seller who violates his duty to exercise good 
faith in attempting to secure the fulfillment of a conditioned 
precedent thereby preventing the underlying contract from coming 
into effect is liable for breach of contract); and cases cited 
therein. 
Thus, in the present case, the Liquidator was under a duty 
to: (1) use its best efforts to achieve fulfillment of the 
condition precedent; (2) make reasonable efforts to achieve 
fulfillment of the condition precedent; (3) act in good faith 
with respect to the fulfillment of the condition precedent; 
and/or (4) not take any steps which would hinder, frustrate, or 
prevent the fulfillment of the condition precedent. 
The Liquidator violated each and every one of these duties. 
As discussed in Part III.D., III.E., and III.F., infra, to the 
extent conditions precedent in the Barn Contract have failed, the 
Liquidator is responsible for the failure of each condition. 
2. A Party Who Waives the Occurrence of a Condition 
Precedent May Not Escape Contractual Liability Based 
Upon the Non-Occurrence of the Condition 
Pursuant to Utah law, any contract provision or condition 
precedent may be waived by the parties. "[W]aiver occurs when an 
obligor manifests an intent not to require an obligee to strictly 
comply with a contractual duty." Lone Mountain Production Co. v. 
Natural Gas Pipeline Co., 710 F. Supp. 305, 311 (D. Utah 1989) 
aff 'd 984 F.2d 1551 (10th Cir. 1992) . Waiver may be expressed or 
implied. It is exhibited through words or through conduct 
"inconsistent with an intent to insist on [the waiving party's] 
contractual rights." Id. See also Ahrendt v. Bobbitt, 229 P.2d 
296, 297 (Utah 1951). A party may show waiver through conduct by 
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acting as if the contract is in force, continuing to perform 
under the contract, urging the other party to continue 
performance, or any other act which exhibits an intent to 
continue with the contract. See 17A C.J.S. § 492(1). 
A party who has waived a contractual right or condition "may 
not thereafter seek judicial enforcement" of that right. Lone 
Mountain, 710 F.Supp. at 311. A party who has, through its 
words or deeds, indicated a willingness to proceed without the 
occurrence of a condition precedent, has waived the condition and 
may not use it to escape its contractual obligations. "[O]ne 
party to a contract may not lull the other into a false assurance 
that strict compliance with a contractual duty will not be 
required and then sue for non-compliance." Id. 
Furthermore, where a sales contract is part of a "package" 
of contracts, a waiver of a condition in one contract constitutes 
a waiver with respect to all of the contracts in the package. 
See Walker v. Feiring, 632 P.2d 1270, 1272 (Or. App. 1981). 
A party may waive terms and conditions under the contract 
despite the existence of an anti-waiver clause in the contract. 
Dillman v. Massey-Fercruson, Inc., 369 P.2d 296, 298 (Utah 1962) 
("parties to written contracts may modify, waive or make new 
terms regardless of provisions in the contracts to the 
contrary"). See also Lone Mountain Production Co. v. Natural Gas 
Pipeline Co., 984 F.2d 1551, 1557 (10th Cir. 1992) ("Under 
general rules, and in particular, under Utah law, parties may 
modify or waive the terms of a contract, despite contractual 
provisions to the contrary.") 
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In the present case, the facts show that the Liquidator 
waived the Simultaneous Closing Provision (see Part III.D., 
infra), the Timing Provisions (see Part III.E., infra), and the 
Tender requirements (see Part III.F., infra). Having waived such 
conditions, the Liquidator cannot now rely upon their non-
occurrence to escape performance and liability owed to Golfland. 
In conclusion to this section, Golfland does not contest the 
Court's finding that the sale was contingent upon conditions 
which never occurred. Golfland does contest, however, the 
Court's failure to acknowledge that the Liquidator: (1) caused 
the non-occurrence of the conditions, and (2) waived the 
conditions. Under Utah law, the Liquidator must not be allowed 
to benefit from its own breach of duty and waiver. Accordingly, 
the failure of conditions does not absolve the Liquidator of its 
contractual obligations toward Golfland. 
D. The Simultaneous Closing Provision 
The Lower Court found that the Barn Contract was frustrated 
by the failure of the Simultaneous Closing Provision. See July 7 
Order, R. 3132 at f 5. The Liquidator may not use the failure of 
this provision to escape its liability to Golfland. 
The Liquidator is responsible for the failure of the 
Simultaneous Closing provision. But for the Liquidator's 
improper conduct, the sale of both the Water Park and the Barn 
would have closed simultaneously on April 8, 1994. First, the 
Liquidator breached its affirmative duty to make sure that the 
conditions were met. Specifically, the Liquidator did not use 
its best efforts and/or did not act reasonably in obtaining court 
approval for the sale of the Water Park. As a result, the 
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Liquidator was unable to obtain title insurance for the Water 
Park and was unable to close on the sale at the scheduled time. 
This caused the Simultaneous Closing Provision of the Barn 
Contract to fail. 
Similarly, the Liquidator breached its duty not to interfere 
or hinder the fulfillment of the conditions. The facts show that 
had the Liquidator not engaged in secret negotiations, double-
dealing, and misrepresentations, the validity of the Court 
approval for the Water Park would never have been challenged and 
the Simultaneous Closing Provision would never have failed. 
Next, the Liquidator has clearly waived enforcement of the 
Simultaneous Closing provision. Although the Liquidator did not 
make an express waiver of this provision on April 8, 1994, it 
indicated a willingness to discuss the possibility of waiver by 
questioning Golfland whether it would be willing to close on the 
Shed and the Barn independent from the Water Park. At that time, 
all parties agreed that there was too much uncertainty and that 
the parties would work together towards a simultaneous closing of 
all three properties as soon as possible. 
Thereafter, the Liquidator expressly waived the simultaneous 
closing provision. The Liquidator did so through various 
communications with Golfland and by attempting to sell the^Water 
Park separate and independent from the Barn and Shed. At no time 
did the Liquidator ever state that the failure of the 
Simultaneous Closing Provision would prevent closing on the sale 
of the Barn. Furthermore, in July, 1994, the Liquidator held an 
auction for the sale of the Water Park independent from the Barn. 
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Later, in 1995, the Liquidator actually sold the Water Park 
separate from the Barn. 
The Liquidator's acts and representations clearly establish 
a waiver of the Simultaneous Closing provision. Now that the 
Liquidator no longer owns the Water Park, it can hardly insist 
that it be sold simultaneously with the Barn. 
In conclusion, because the Liquidator caused the 
Simultaneous Closing Provision to fail and because the Liquidator 
waived the provision, the Simultaneous Closing Provision is no 
longer a condition of the Barn Contract and cannot be used by the 
Liquidator to escape its contractual obligations toward Golfland. 
E. The Timing Provisions 
The Lower Court specifically found that "the closing of the 
sale of the SAIC Barn to Golfland did not occur in a timely 
fashion." (See July 7 Order, R. 3132 at % 4). Contrary to the 
Liquidator's position, this failure of the Timing Provisions did 
not absolve the Liquidator of its contractual responsibilities to 
Golfland. 
First, as explained above, the Liquidator was responsible 
for the failure to close. But for the Liquidator's improper 
actions and omissions, the sale of the Barn would have been 
completed on April 8, 1994. The law is clear that one who 
prevents the occurrence of a condition cannot take advantage of 
its non-occurrence. Thus, despite the failure to close on April 
8, 1994, Golfland is entitled to the fruits of the Barn Contract. 
Next, even if the Liquidator did not cause the failure to 
close, the record is clear that it has waived the right to insist 
upon compliance with the Timing Provisions. As discussed in Part 
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III.C.2., supra, a party is deemed to have waived a contract 
provision if it acts in a manner inconsistent with an intent to 
enforce the condition. 
Contractual time constraints, including "time is of the 
essence" clauses may be waived by failing to insist upon strict 
compliance with such clauses. 
[I]f the vendor, for whose benefit the stipulation 
about time being of the essence of the contract is 
made, would insist upon it, he must act promptly 
upon that provision so that any indulgence upon 
his part will amount to a nullification of that 
feature of the covenant. 
Walker v. Feirinq, 632 P.2d 1270, 1272 (Or. App. 1981) (emphasis 
added). 
A party seeking to avoid its obligations based upon a 
contract timing provision must timely assert its rights under the 
provision. If, after the expiration of the contract timing 
provision, the party continues to proceed under the contract, the 
timing provision is dropped from the contract and the remaining 
portions of the contract continue in effect until and unless the 
party gives notice of an intent to again strictly enforce the 
timing provision. See id. 
In the present case, the facts show that the Liquidator has 
waived its rights to enforce the Timing Provisions of the Barn 
Contract. On multiple occasions, time and time again, the 
Liquidator has acted in a manner inconsistent with an intent to 
enforce the Timing Provisions. 
First, at the time of the failed closing on April 8, 1994, 
the Liquidator led Golfland to believe that, notwithstanding the 
Timing Provisions, it was not necessary to close on the sale of 
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the Barn Property at that time. It led Golfland to believe that 
the parties could and would close on the sale of the Combined 
Properties after the problems with the sale of the Water Park 
were resolved. 
Thereafter, over the next few months, the Liquidator on 
several occasions demonstrated an intent to waive the Timing 
Provisions. Golfland has identified 8 different occasions from 
April through July 1994 where the Liquidator led Golfland to 
believe that it still intended to complete the sale of the Barn 
to Golfland. (See R. 2040-2043). 
It was not until August, 1994 (after the Liquidator learned 
that it could obtain more money if it would repudiate its 
contractual obligations toward Golfland), that the Liquidator 
suddenly reversed its position on the timing issue. At that 
time, the Liquidator first attempted to use the Timing Provisions 
to escape its obligations to Golfland. Suddenly, notwithstanding 
its earlier representations, the Liquidator sought to strictly 
enforce the Timing Provisions -- arguing that Golfland lost all 
rights in the Barn when the sale failed to close on April 8, 
1994.31 
In light of the clear facts of this case, the Liquidator's 
current position is simply untenable. Under the law, the 
Liquidator is not allowed to lull Golfland in to a false 
assurance, and then suddenly demand strict compliance. Having 
waived all rights under the Timing Provisions, the Liquidator may 
31
 The alleged failure of the Timing Provisions was 
obviously an afterthought -- brought up after-the-fact in a 
belated attempt to justify the Liquidator's blatant breach of 
contractual obligations toward Golfland. 
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not use such provisions to escape its liabilities under the Barn 
Contract. The Liquidator waived any right to demand strict 
compliance with the Timing Provisions by acting in a manner 
entirely inconsistent with an intent to enforce such provisions. 
Accordingly, the Liquidator may not be allowed to strictly 
enforce the Timing Provisions at this time. 
In conclusion, because the Liquidator (1) caused the failure 
of the Timing Provisions, and (2) waived the Timing Provisions, 
Golfland should be allowed to pursue its rights under the Barn 
Contract notwithstanding the failure of the Timing Provisions. 
F. Golfland's Tender of the Purchase Price 
In the July 7 Order, the Liquidator found that "Golfland's 
tender of the purchase funds for the SAIC Barn with the strings 
that Golfland attached to it did not amount to the proper tender 
with respect to closing." (See July 7 Order, R. 3132 H 3). This 
finding is erroneous as a matter of fact and law. 
The record shows that Golfland was prepared to tender the 
full purchase price for all three Seven Peaks' properties within 
two weeks after the auction. The Liquidator, however, was unable 
to convey full title to the property at that time. Accordingly, 
it was agreed by both parties that Golfland would deposit its 
purchase money with the Title Company and that the sale would 
close on April 8, 1994 -- after the Liquidator had obtained full 
title to the property. In accordance with this agreement, 
Golfland deposited the full purchase price with the Title Company 
in a timely manner. Golfland instructed the Title Company that 
the funds should be held for the benefit of Golfland until 
further notice. Golfland did so in order to protect its interest 
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in the funds pending the Liquidator's ability to convey title. 
Golfland's retention of discretion over the funds was in full 
compliance with the terms of the Barn Contract and the agreement 
of the parties. Thus, the Court's finding that Golfland's tender 
was insufficient is erroneous. 
Furthermore, and more importantly, even if Golfland's tender 
was somehow lacking, the Liquidator clearly waived the right to 
challenge the sufficiency of the tender. At the time of the 
tender, Golfland sent a copy of its tender instruction letter to 
the Liquidator's counsel. Thus, the Liquidator was on notice as 
of March 9, 1994, as to the form and nature of Golfland's tender. 
At no time, however, did the Liquidator object to the fact that 
Golfland had retained some discretion over the funds. At no time 
did the Liquidator indicate that there was anything deficient 
whatsoever about the tender. On the contrary, the Liquidator 
stated on numerous occasions that Golfland's tender was fully 
adequate. For example: 
1. The Liquidator testified that, pursuant to its 
interpretation of the Sales Contracts, Golfland was required 
to deposit its money in escrow with the title company within 
two weeks. The Liquidator testified that it communicated 
this interpretation of the closing requirements to counsel 
for Golfland. The Liquidator further testified that 
Golfland did in fact deposit such funds as required. (See 
R. 2017 at H 106(a)). 
2. On another occasion, the Liquidator represented in 
writing the following to the Bankruptcy Court: 
As required by its bid, Golfland deposited the 
full purchase price of $2.61 million with the 
title company pending closing on April 9, 1994. 
At the closing on April 9, all conveyance 
documents were executed. The instructions to the 
escrow agent are to record the conveyance 
documents and disburse funds upon the issuance of 
the policy of title insurance. 
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(See R. 2017-2018 at % 106(b)). 
3. On yet another occasion, the Liquidator testified 
that Golfland, in depositing the funds with the title 
company, had done "all that they had to do." (See R. 2018 
at 1 106(c)). 
4. The Liquidator further explained: " [W] e were 
satisfied as of March 8th that [Golfland] had complied with 
what they needed to do." (See R. 2018 at 1 106(c)). 
5. Later, when Golfland determined that it was 
advisable to withdraw the funds deposited for the purchase 
of the Water Park Property, it sought and obtained written 
approval from the Liquidator to do so. This illustrates 
that Golfland did not have unilateral discretion over the 
funds and that the withdrawal of such funds required the 
approval of both parties. It also illustrates that the 
Liquidator approved of the form of Golfland's tender. (See 
R. 2046) . 
6. On July 13, 1994, the Liquidator signed its 
approval to Golfland's letter instructing the Title Company 
to hold the remaining funds "pending further instructions 
from Golfland." If such discretion is improper, the 
Liquidator should never have signed its approval. By 
approving Golfland's arrangement with the title company, the 
Liquidator again waived any right to subsequently declare 
the arrangement improper. (See R. 2019 at % 110). 
In reliance upon the Liquidator's actions and statements as 
to the sufficiency of Golfland's tender, Golfland made no effort 
to alter the status of its tender of the purchase price. 
Suddenly, in August 1994, notwithstanding its previous 
testimony and conduct, the Liquidator switched positions and 
argued for the very first time that Golfland's tender was 
insufficient.32 
The Liquidator's conduct illustrates a waiver of the right 
to contest the sufficiency of Golfland's tender (even assuming 
that the tender was inadequate). The Liquidator's silence in 
32
 It should be noted that the Liquidator did not take this 
position until after it received the Provo City offer for more 
money on the sale of the Barn. 
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failing to object to the sufficiency of the tender for nearly six 
months -- and its affirmative conduct in testifying that the 
tender was sufficient -- are wholly inconsistent with the 
subsequent self-serving statement that the tender was deficient. 
If the Liquidator had complaints about the form of 
Golfland's tender, it should have made them known. Instead, the 
Liquidator led Golfland to believe that the tender was sufficient 
when it testified, on multiple occasions, that the Liquidator 
believed the tender to be complete and when it signed its 
approval to the form of such tender. Having taken this position, 
the Liquidator may not assert the opposite position at this time. 
The Liquidator may not lull Golfland into a false assurance and 
then attempt to demand strict compliance as a basis to avoid 
liability. 
In conclusion, the Lower Court erred in finding that 
Golfland's tender was not sufficient. Furthermore, the Court 
erred in failing to acknowledge, or even consider, the fact that 
the Liquidator waived the right to object to the sufficiency of 
Golfland's tender. 
CONCLUSION 
Golfland respectfully requests the Court to reverse the July 
7 Order, to reinstate the validity of the February 24 Order, and 
49 
to allow Golfland to pursue its claims against the Liquidator in 
the pending Barn Litigation. 
DATED this / S day of May, 1998. 
CALLISTER NEBEKER & McCULLOUGH 
Zachary T. Shields 
Attorneys for Golfland 
Entertainment Centers, Inc, 
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1 E R O £ E . E . D £ N G S _ 
2 THE COURT: Do we have everyone here in the courtroom 
3 on the Southern American Insurance Company case? 
4 MR. CARLILE: No, I'll go get them. 
5 THE COURT: Would you please? 
6 Before we get started is there a Mr. Michael Harris 
7 in the courtroom? 
8 UNKNOWN SPEAKER: Yes. 
9 THE COURT: And there have been two late filings. 
10 Golfland filed an objection, but I got the motion filed 
11 yesterday for Valley Asphalt asking for me to liquidate 
12 it, and then just a few minutes ago a motion from 
13 Golfland was delivered to me, asking me to continue 
14 today's hearing date; asking for a little scope of the 
15 hearing. I'd like more time on these motions, I don't 
16 like late filings but we're all here. Why don't you 
17 each take a minute to address everything that's before 
18 us and what you think we can best accomplish today. 
19 MR. CARLILE: I'm Craig Carlile and I'm representing 
20 the Southern American Insurance Company. I've been out 
21 of town for three days. I came back this morning and Mr. 
22 Monson is here with me, from our office. He was aware 
23 that Valley Asphalt had filed, I believe it's a motion 
24 for me to file a complaint for insubordination and 
25 bankruptcy procedure. I haven't seen those pleadings, 
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1 I'm positive, from Valley Asphalt. And I understand 
2 those kinds of things (inaudible). They came hand-
3 delivered to our office this morning by Mr. Shields 
4 contingent to this hearing. 
"5 We don't think, first of all, the Valley Asphalt 
6 client, that they have any reason to be in this 
7 proceeding at all. We're dealing with the water park 
8 order and the evidence of the water park case, BCD 
9 bankruptcy case. They have no interest in the water 
10 park. Those are issues that we can address at some 
11 point, but I don't think they have any bearing on the 
12 motion with the liquidator at this state, to capture the 
13 bid for the water park. 
14 As to Mr. Shield's motion to continue, my vote is 
15 briefly to look at that, I have not read it in detail. 
16 THE COURT: I haven't looked at it beyond reading the 
17 caption, I haven't even seen it. 
18 MR. CARLILE: Well, essentially what they are asking 
19 is that they continue because John Kennedy of Golfland 
20 is not available for this hearing today. And that it 
21 really prostitutes the honor to serve the client as they 
22 are required. 
23 My response to that would be several responses 
24 actually. One, well, the other thing that they argue to 
25 that motion is that this hearing is an expedited hearing 
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1 and there's no reason or emergency that exists for an 
2 expedited hearing. But this is not an expedited hearing, 
3 it's not an expedited motion. It was filed in court as 
4 the Judge ruled. 
5 THE COURT: No, I grant you, this is not an expedited 
6 hearing, it's proceeded under the normal course of rules 
7 of so procedure and Code of Judicial Administration. 
8 MR. CARLILE: The second issue is as to whether Mr. 
9 Kennedy is present and whether there ought to be --
10 whether this hearing ought to be continued. The question 
11 is, what does he offer to this hearing? What is the 
12 need to have Mr. Kennedy here? 
13 What this is, is a motion to approve the use of cash 
14 in the estate to enhance the bid, which in the 
15 liquidator's best judgment interest would be the thing 
16 to do. So what is an issue is what the liquidator's 
17 interest business judgment actually is in this 
18 particular case, and Mr. Kennedy has nothing to offer as 
19 to what the liquidator's business judgment is in the 
20 facts on this case. If Mr. Kennedy were present, I 
21 think what Mr. Kennedy would have to offer is that this 
22 water park would indeed be worth $3,040,000, which is 
23 what Golfland offered in the second bid. And that's what 
24 we're saying. Why we want to arrange to enhance this 
25 bid is because this water park is worth more than the 
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1 $242,000 that Golfland said before, which the bankruptcy 
2 court has set aside. In the event he could offer a 
3 premium offer. 
4 Now, other than that, we think we ought to be able 
5 to go forward and I ask the Court why it is in the best 
6 interest of this estate --
7 THE COURT: Thank you. We'll come back to that. 
8 Thank you. 
9 Mr. Shields? 
10 MR. SHIELDS: My name is Jeffrey R. Shields, I 
11 represent Golfland with a motion to continue. I think a 
12 little more background is necessary. The motion to go 
13 to bankruptcy court is scheduled to be here next 
14 Wednesday with the notice out in June. My client and I 
15 both anticipate, we plan to be at that hearing next 
16 Wednesday. We both planned to be out of town and I 
17 asked him to be here today, but Mr. Kennedy is out of 
18 town and he cannot be here. 
19 Last Friday Mr. Carlile called me and asked for an 
20 extension of the deadline for our losses in excess 
21 damages to be filed to this court's order, and there was 
22 no mention of this hearing. I didn't get notice of this 
23 hearing until Monday evening, and I had to cancel my 
24 vacation plans and be here, and I can't get John 
25 Kennedy. When I tried to call and schedule I was told 
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1 that what the emergency is, is an emergency for this 
2 hearing next Wednesday in bankruptcy court, if we don't 
3 having this hearing today before that hearing next 
4 Wednesday, there is going to be a real problem. I don't 
5 think there is an emergency. 
6 THE COURT: You didn't hear that from my clerk. We 
7 don't even know about bankruptcy here, in fact we don't 
8 concern ourselves with what's going on in bankruptcy 
9 court. 
10 MR. SHIELDS: I was told that because of the hearing 
11 in bankruptcy court on Wednesday that's why we had to 
12 have this hearing today. 
13 THE COURT: Who told you that? 
14 MR. SHIELDS: I thought it was your clerk. 
15 THE COURT: Okay, go ahead. 
16 MR. SHIELDS: Anyway, your Honor, the reason I don't 
17 think this hearing should be held today is one, because 
18 I only had two days notice for it, my client is not 
19 here, and I'm not sure as to whether or not this is 
20 evidentiary hearing or not, if the Court intends to take 
21 evidence, but we're not --
22 THE COURT: It's not going to be an evidentiary 
23 hearing. 
24 MR. SHIELDS: Okay. Your Honor, the people needed 
25 evidence that is going to be taken because I see some 
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1 substantial facts that are critical to the Court for 
2 determination. 
3 For example, what is the risk of the estate getting 
4 money back? What is the likelihood of equitable 
5 subordination of their client without a competing 
6 business in the property? They cite things like the 
7 opinion of BCD who is one of the complainants and even 
8 if all the unsecured creditors don't get paid, they'll 
9 get 96% of the money back. Those are heavy duty factual 
10 issues. 
11 THE COURT: Certificate of service on this motion 
12 says it was hand delivered to your office in the 30th of 
13 June. Do you want to address that? 
14 MR. SHIELDS: The motion was, but no notice of 
15 hearing. See, the hearing wasn't scheduled until Monday 
16 and I would work -- if I had at least known I would have 
17 arranged Mr. Kennedy's schedule last week, but when I 
18 didn't get it until Monday, I just can't be here. If 
19 it's not an evidentiary hearing, I'm prepared to argue 
20 the legal aspect. 
21 Your Honor, I think there are some significant 
22 factual aspects that this Court needs to hear. We're 
23 talking about a $3,000,000 asset, and what the 
24 liquidators are asking to do is use the state money to 
25 go buy that asset and then they say don't worry we'll 
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1 give it all back. There are some significant issues 
2 that relate to that that I think this Court should hear. 
3 THE COURT: Thank you. 
4 MR. ZUNDELL: Mr. Zundell, your Honor. 
5 THE COURT: Mr. Zundell? 
6 MR. ZUNDELL: Valley Asphalt is here, your Honor, 
7 because of paragraph 13 of the order the Court issued in 
8 this case, Valley Asphalt, which proceeded in the 
9 bankruptcy court, to determine whether or not SAIC will 
10 receive money on a priority basis from that bankruptcy 
11 case. 
12 We have been threatened with contempt asserting 
13 that, by the liquidators attorneys, asserting that 
14 paragraph 13 prevents that. We don't think that is 
15 true. 
16 The action we would like filed is insubordination 
17 claim that would proceed in a bankruptcy court under 
18 Section 510 of the Bankruptcy Code. And it would 
19 proceed by adversary proceeding directed at the claim 
20 that has been filed by SAIC in the bankruptcy court. 
21 THE COURT: Why is this matter so urgent in terms of 
22 the timing? 
23 MR. ZUNDELL: Because the claim we have a hearing, 
24 preliminary scheduled in the bankruptcy court at 11:00 
25 Wednesday morning, which is just a few hours before the 
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1 hearing on the motion to sell this property and allow 
2 the SAIC liquidator to press bid. And our motion would 
3 seek an injunction against the credit on the basis that 
4 the SAIC was insubordinate for the actions taken since 
5 the bankruptcy case began. 
6 We think that those -- we understand that SAIC's 
7 position is said that my client doesn't have another 
8 claim, that's something for the bankruptcy court to 
9 determine. That's something for the interest of the 
10 bankruptcy court to determine. We don't think that their 
11 claim can be well- received on that part, and we just 
12 simply want to get to the tribunal to have jurisdiction 
13 to decide this issue. We think it's the better part of 
14 discretion to come to this Court to threaten with 
15 contempt and ask to proceed. 
16 THE COURT: Why did you wait so long to file a motion 
17 when you would been aware for some time, I assume, that 
18 the liquidator was going to proceed with attempting to 
19 utilize the credit as part of this. 
20 MR. ZUNDELL: You say we've been aware for this time, 
21 I don't know that that's true. 
22 THE COURT: It was published around the end of June, 
23 wasn't it, Mr. Carlile? 
24 MR. CARLILE: Yes. 
25) THE COURT: You're talking about notice as the fact 
8 
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1 that they attempted the bid on the water park. 
2 MR. ZUNDELL: Perhaps, yes. The only reason we 
3 waited so long, your Honor, is that this is one action 
4 in a long line of actions that we've taken. My offer on 
5 this probably stands in the neighborhood of $50,000 in 
6 the last four months on this case. And it would have 
7 been very accurate in this case as related case of CES, 
8 it's time now to get to this issue. 
9 THE COURT: Well, with respect to your motion my 
10 initial question is, you can file a motion before the 
11 Court, I'm be happy to consider it, why shouldn't I give 
12 the normal amount of time allowed by the rules to SAIC 
13 to respond to your motion; giving you a chance to reply 
14 and set it for some time down the road? 
15 MR. ZUNDELL: Because we didn't have it, your Honor, 
16 until the 6th of July. 
17 THE COURT: That's right. So why didn't you file 
18 your motion in time so we can take the normal process 
19 and have everybody have time to fully bring some 
20 standing issues instead of telling me yesterday? 
21 MR. ZUNDELL: I apologize for failing to do that, 
22 sir. I can only say that we have not sat on our hands. 
23 We have been working very hard on this case and there 
24 are many good matters. Mr. Affleck (sp?) has spent 
25 money long hours on this, long days and nights on this 
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1 case and this matter has just now come to a head. 
2 THE COURT: And how is it your client would be 
3 possibly prejudice if we don't resolve the motion 
4 immediately? 
5 MR. ZUNDELL: Well, we wish to have the bankruptcy 
6 court determine whether or not BCD ought to be allowed 
7 to credit bid, based upon a claim of subordination. 
8 THE COURT: Yet the hearing is scheduled to address 
9 that issue next Wednesday in the bankruptcy court? 
10 MR. ZUNDELL: That's right. And as a preliminary to 
11 that hearing, we need to file that complaint in our 
12 papers with bankruptcy court. And we've been told by 
13 the liquidators that if we do that they will bring us 
14 before you on charge of contempt. 
15 THE COURT: Okay. Anything further? 
16 MR. SHIELDS: That's what bring us here judge. Say 
17 for that threat we would assume to proceed and file our 
18 papers with the court. I'm not sure when the threat was 
19 issued, but in that aspect since we may go all the way 
20 to this Court is why we've waited so long. 
21 THE COURT: Let me ask Mr. Carlile first on what the 
22 SAIC provision is on this? 
23 MR. CARLILE: I'm not aware of any such threat. I've 
24 gone over this and discussed this with Mr. Affleck and 
25 he indicated that has not made threats. If there's a 
10 
Addendum - Page [2. 
1 threat, it exists in the court order that they filed 
2 against it, so they had insurance company without proper 
3 court clearance and it would be something to this 
4 Court's rulings on how this court needs it done 
5 appropriately, under the circumstances, 
6 THE COURT: Do you agree that paragraph 13 of this 
7 1992 order bars the filing of an action outside of this 
8 Court without expressed approval? 
9 MR. CARLILE: Yes. That's why we came here before 
10 when Golfland was seeking approval of this Court to file 
11 a claim. In terms of circumstances, that is in the eye 
12 of the beholder, but there is not any kind of an 
13 emergency matter that's been proceeding that I'm aware 
14 of in the last several months. I have done a lot of 
15 work for Valley Asphalt that I think is unnecessary, but 
16 that's not the point either. 
17 The point is that the understanding Valley Asphalt 
18 has, is that they filed a complaint over three 
19 properties, the fire property and water park property 
20 and golf course property. So the litigation with them 
21 was to determine whether there was a valid claim or 
22 invalid claim. The bankruptcy court determined that that 
23 was a valid claim and we disagree with that, but that 
24 was determined. So they have a secured claim on those 
25 properties to which applied. 
11 
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1 Now, according to that Court there's no amount of 
2 that meaning attributable to the water and fire 
3 property. That's their only claim and the way they've 
4 apportioned those claims, and so they don't have 
5 anything that has to do with the water park issue. 
6 In terms of being prejudice, if they did have a 
7 claim, it would be a secured claim. It would get paid 
8 out first. There can't be any prejudice to them because 
9 they got paid out before the unsecured creditors and 
10 we're 97% percent to the unsecured creditors in any 
11 event. 
12 So, any way you look at it, one is not in effect of 
13 the circumstance, two, they can't be prejudice because 
14 they're going to get paid out, and three, as the Court 
15 has well indicated, this matter is to replace the 
16 bankruptcy proceeding notice of this file that was 
17 mailed out on June 30th. And here we are on the eve of 
18 this hearing, and they want to have an expedited hearing 
19 and I haven't had an opportunity to look at it. 
20 THE COURT: You think it would prejudice SAIC, the 
21 liquidator, if we went ahead and granted it and filed 
22 our lawsuit before the hearing on Wednesday? 
23 MR. CARLILE: Well, I think it could, in the sense if 
24 it has a potential of stopping the sale and we loose the 
25| opportunity to go forward. I think it could have a 
12 
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1 significant affect on Southern American Insurance 
2 Company in this case. I don't think there's any dispute 
3 that there would be any increased expenses to the 
4 trustee, increased administrative expenses, and once the 
5 park is sold, if the trustee eventually can get over the 
6 title problem, the trustee gets a significant commission 
7 off of that. And who is injured by that? All the 
8 creditors of BCD and Southern American Insurance Company 
9 would be increased by the cost. 
10 THE COURT: Okay. Thank you, Mr. Carlile. 
11 MR. SHIELDS: Your Honor, this Court asked if the 
12 SAIC would be prejudice if we allowed this lawsuit and I 
13 understood the answer to be is yes, if we loose it. And 
14 all of the bad things that will happen to SAIC according 
15 to Mr. Carlile will only happen if Judge Clark decides 
16 that they should happen. And that's what we want. And 
17 what they're saying is we don't want judge Clark to have 
18 the issue up, we want you to it stop, Judge. And we 
19 want you to stop SAIC from talking. You can stop Valley 
20 Asphalt from talking to Judge Clark. That's what they 
21 say this order is. I really don't think it does that, 
22 but when someone threatens you for contempt, out of 
23 respect for the judicial process, I think we should come 
24 and ask. We ask the Court to allow us to go to a judge 
25| that has the jurisdiction to decide these issues. 
13 
Addendum - Page 15" 
1 THE COURT: Okay. On the Valley Asphalt motion we'll 
2 allow Southern American and Golfland to respond to it --
3 some time to respond in writing. How much time would be 
4 reasonable, Mr. Carlile, a short time? 
5 MR. CARLILE: Well, I had the same thing that Mr. 
6 Shield's has, I came down form scout camp on Wednesday 
7 and I'm on my way back up. So, this week is really shot 
8 for me. Mr. Monson can work on this obviously, and get 
9 what we need to, but I need some time to be able to look 
10 at it and I'm not going to be able to have it. 
11 THE COURT: Tell me what it's going to take. 
12 MR. CARLILE: Well, if your intent's to rule before 
13 the sale on Wednesday --
14 THE COURT: I don't think that can be done. 
15 MR. CARLILE: Then I would like next week. 
16 THE COURT: Let's have any response that is going to 
17 be filed, filed by a week from tomorrow. And if we need 
18 another hearing I'll contact you. I think Mr. Zundell 
19 can go to bankruptcy court on Wednesday and tell the 
20 Court Judge Clark that the motion has been filed for 
21 leave in this court and that's been considered subject 
22 to additional submission by the parties. You'll have an 
23 opportunity to respond to anything that Mr. Carlile 
24 files, and I'll rule on that in due course, and I cannot 
25 imagine that it will stop Judge Clark from considering 
14 
Addendum - Page \fo 
1 anything that is brought before. 
2 MR. ZUNDELL: Thank you, Judge. 
3 MR. SHIELDS: Thank you. 
4 THE COURT: Let's go ahead on the other motion. Mr. 
5 Carlile, address the merits on that. 
6 MR. CARLILE: All right. I would like to simply say 
7 that in the motion for Golfland to continue this 
8 hearing, there's a number of issues that go to -- or 
9 statements that go to the merits of our motion and I 
10 believe that we have not had an opportunity to respond 
11 to. 
12 THE COURT: Mr. Zundell, do you want to create an 
13 order to the effect of the schedule that I just said? 
14 MR. ZUNDELL: Yes, your Honor. 
15 THE COURT: Thank you. 
16 Excuse the interruption. 
17 MR. CARLILE: And part of that, that has us 
18 concerned, we filed that motion and stated our facts in 
19 our motion they filed a memorandum in opposition and 
20 they challenged the factual statements that were made by 
21 the motion. That's how we received that memo that they 
22 had this motion today. And I think for the purposes of 
23 this motion most procedural matters are established 
24 because they failed to object to those as provided in 
25| the rules . 
15 
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1 To this extent, this Court is troubled by that and 
2 we wanted to present evidence and certainly we want to 
3 present that, and we want the opportunity to respond to 
4 that motion for continuation which are in effect to 
5 certify our motion. 
6 We can go through the -- for the Court the status of 
7 things how they now stand. Southern American Insurance 
8 Company winds up with approximately $9,000,000 dollars 
9 to BCD, what is now called BCD, subject to our Mr. 
10 Orchard, the president of Ail-American Food Company, and 
11 his wife Suzanne, who was there at the time. What we're 
12 trying to do is try and recover as much of that 
13 $9,000,000 and the liquidators are trying to recover as 
14 much of that as possible. They are only secured creditor 
15 in the water park, and they are owed probably 90% or 70% 
16 of the unsecured claims. It was a largest creditor by 
17 far. 
18 There was a bankruptcy claim and there's a 
19 negotiated claim that was put into effect that the park 
20 be sold and that allowed Southern American Insurance 
21 Company liquidation to credit it's secured claim in that 
22 plan. 
23 The plan was extended -- by that, they had it 
24 extended, I'm sorry, on July 31st of this year. As you 
25 well know there was a sale, or bidding, occurred, and 
16 
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1 the bid was approved in that sale. The whole sale set 
2 aside by Jeff Clark. Ever since then they've tried to 
3 sell the park or have BCD sell the park in an effort to 
4 comply with that bankruptcy claim that offered every 
5 term and do whatever they can to try to thwart that bid. 
6 We have the second bid process with Peak Investment 
7 being the highest bidder. Golfland bid $3,040,000 at 
8 that time. They were unable to come up with that money 
9 many and Golfland refused to continue at that time with 
10 the $3,040,000, we are now here. The liquidator has 
11 attempted to market this property and everybody who has 
12 expressed an interest in this park has one concern, and 
13 that is, whether they can get title insurance. 
14 The problem is the appeal Golfland filed in Judge 
15 Clark's ruling. We have not been able to find a title 
16 company that would be willing to ensure around that 
17 appeal, and so that appeal is having a chilling affect 
18 on the bidding. There is no question that that would 
19 happen. 
20 We work with a trade for BCD, BCD sought to have the 
21 day for the plan completion extended from July 31st in 
22 order to wait out the appeal period, for Golfland. 
23 Golfland objected to that, and amazingly they objected 
24 to that, to the additional time to have that completed. 
25| And now they are coming back and objecting to having the 
17 
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1 plan completed as per it's terms. And I think it should 
2 be abundantly clear on one reason and that is because 
3 they chill all of our bids and they eliminate all of the 
4 competing bids, including that of Southern American 
5 Insurance Company as a secured claimant. 
6 Now, in their latest filing they argued that, in 
7 fact, this motion may be unnecessary if Golfland is 
8 being sincere in what they said in their motion to 
9 continue, which was they don't intend to credit that 
10 sale on Wednesday. If that were true, then we would not 
11 need additional cash to proceed with this sale, but in 
12 order to protect against the contingencies we were 
13 required to seek the approval in this court and proceed 
14 in that fashion. 
15 This park has been operated now by BCD with a 
16 manger, Paul Beck, and Southern American Insurance 
17 Company were to acquire this park and sell, we would 
18 continue with that engagement to engage Mr. Paul Beck as 
1 9 a manager. 
20 On the last couple of years since it has been out of 
21 the control of the Orchards', this department has 
22 enhanced the value significantly of this and it has been 
23 very profitable. Last year $500,000 was projected, this 
24 year it would be $700,000, and all of that money is to 
25| the benefit of the BCD creditors. And now Golfland 
18 
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1 wants to make certain that this somehow goes to the 7th 
2 or now they're putting us in the position where we have 
3 to buy it now. And after the sale then it becomes the 
4 Southern American Insurance Company. I don't understand ! 
5 the philosophy behind Valley Asphalt and Golfland trying I 
6 to force us so we can all proceed from the sale and try 
7 to take it. 
8 The only objection that I think we need to address 
9 in this matter, because all the other objections will be 
10 addressed in the bankruptcy court at some point, and 
11 that is, whether we have properly proceeded in this 
12 manner. Whether the liquidator has properly proceeded 
13 in this manner. And I would refer the Court to the 
14 Powers of the Liquidators Code. In section 31-A-27-314 
15 and it enumerates all the powers of the liquidator. And 
16 number six says that the liquidator may collect all 
17 debts and claims due and money belonging to the insurer, 
18 and then it goes on at the end, and pursue any creditors 
19 available to enforce this claim. That's all we're doing 
20 in this particular case. Understand this, I think it's 
21 important, that Golfland says that the offer that the 
22 liquidator has made of bankruptcy is so untenical that 
23 they don't intend to proceed with an offer on their own, 
24 at least the conditions. 
25 What the liquidator is accomplishing is a 
19 
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1 foreclosure. In a foreclosure we won't get title 
2 insurance, we won't get environmental warranties, we 
3 won't get any of those things that we agreed to waive in 
4 this proceeding and we're credit bidding, and the fact 
5 is, we're foreclosing and we are taking those 
6 conditions. And the other effect is we now have this 
7 property out at two different court proceedings, we now 
8 have it here in this court, where if we operate it and 
9 get it out of this court's proceeding direction, for the 
10 benefit of our creditors. We're just pursuing our 
11 creditors in subsection 6. Golfland comes back and 
12 argues that in subsection 9, that the liquidator has 
13 proceeded improperly because any transaction involving 
14 the property worth a value exceeding $25,000 requires 
15 this Court's authority. And they argue that because 
16 this property is a large amount of money in excess of 
17 $25,000, anything we do with the property requires this 
18 Court's authority. Required authority from this court. 
19 That simply can't be the reading of that provision, 
20 because that would mean in time there's an asset 
21 available out there at a value of $25,000, there isn't 
22 one thing we can do. We can't conclude any 
23 transactions. We couldn't buy a postage stamp because 
24 the property's worth $25,000 or more than that, and if 
25| concluded any transaction subject to that property we 
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1 want to set up an empire we have to come to this court. 
2 The proper reading of that provision, and let me 
3 back up, the other thing that Golfland's argument does 
4 is superimposes number 9 of the Powers of the 
5 Liquidator, and that's not how this provision is read. 
6 The other aspect is the proper reading of that 
7 section is, any time the liquidator puts at risk 
8 property of this estate over $25,000, that's when we 
9 need to come to this court and get approval. 
10 But, in any event, we're here, and we're asking the 
11 Court on behalf of the liquidator to approve the use of 
12 cash in this estate to enhance the bid. Why? Because we 
13 know the property's worth more than 2.2 million 
14 dollars. Golfland is issuing 3 million dollars. We have 
15 an offer for 3 million. We've talked to other people who 
16 are interested in that amount in excess of 2.2 million 
17 dollars and we can't sell it because of the title 
18 insurance. 
19 So in order to comply with the plan, and that's all 
20 we're doing is complying with the bankruptcy plan, we'll 
21 proceed with the offer to the BCD Corporation, the 
22 debtor under the confirmed plan, in a credit bid, and in 
23 this Court's authority to enhance that bid, because most 
24 of that money, not all, comes back to the business 
25| estate, and we are a talking about $800,000. 
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1 THE COURT: Okay. Thank you, Mr. Carlile. Mr. 
2 Shields? 
3 MR. SHIELDS: Your Honor, 25 percent of what Mr. 
4 Carlile talked about was facts. What he's doing, he's 
5 up here arguing facts. Facts that are in dispute. 
6 Facts that I think refer the Court to make a poor 
7 judgment, and I think you need to see the other side of 
8 those facts. The rule requires when you want to argue 
9 facts at hearings you file an affidavit or you cite to 
10 the record where those facts are placed -- depositions, 
11 answers to interrogatories. We have no record of 
12 citation in this case. I'm citing to rule 4501, subpart 
13 1, that says you file a motion, you file a memorandum, 
14 you appoint authority, you file an affidavit for your 
15 facts. We don't have a single affidavit in this case. 
16 Yet, what Mr. Carlile argues is the values, what's going 
17 to happen in the bankruptcy court, how much the property 
18 is worth, whether the bidders we have, the creditors in 
19 that case, whether or not their claim to be 
20 insubordinate, that's lots of issues that relate to 
21 facts that I think this Court needs to hear before they 
22 rule. 
23 That's what concerned us about the short notice of 
24 the hearing. There is no record the only record you 
25 could get is through having evidence and yet we don't 
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1 have any evidence. Golfland does not admit to the facts 
2 Mr. -Carlile speaks about. We don't agree that they're 
3 trying to sell his property, not according to the plan. 
4 This Court will review the plan and you will review the 
5 sale tht they're proposing, and their substantial 
6 differences and we'll present these to the bankruptcy 
7 court and there will be another hearing in the 
8 bankruptcy court to consider those issues. 
9 What we think it's disingenuous for him to stand up 
10 here and say all those facts, undisputed, go ahead 
11 Judge, and you can rule because this is the issue for 
12 what this estate needs. I don't think that is how this 
13 court should proceed. 
14 There is some substantial issues about the validity 
15 as I see it. The main right the Golfer has, SAIC stands 
16 in a conflict of position. Several months after the 
17 bankruptcy was filed for BCD, SAIC, through a stock 
18 transaction, acquired the ownership. Mr. Leonard told 
19 me that the liquidation has to be issued to SEC 
20 creditors. It also has to be issued to the BCD 
21 creditors. And what's happened is that over the last 
22 few months he's neglected his duties to the BCD 
23 creditors to try and get the SEC permits. He should 
24 have gotten independent trustee permits in the meantime, 
25 when he could have done it. 
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1 For example, Mr. Leonard Stillman had his deposition 
2 taken. One of the questions that was asked was, how do 
3 you value the allocation of your property versus 
4 personal property, because as SAIC admits in their 
5 pleadings, they only have a lien on real estate, they 
6 don't have a lien to personal property. Yet a 
7 substantial value of that property is personal property. 
8 In fact, BCD has also scheduled a compromise with Utah 
9 County that says 50 percent of the value of the water 
10 park is personal property. Now, 50 percent of the value 
11 of the water park is personal property in that sense he 
12 doesn't only owe on real property, they can't credit it 
13 half the value of the water property. They have to use 
14 cash. But it you read the offer in this motion, they've 
15 assumed that all money to this is going to be 
16 accredited, but I asked Mr. Stillman how do you intend 
17 to allocate the difference between real and personal 
18 property? He said he really never thought of that 
19 issue. Well, the creditors of BCD certainly thought of 
20 that issue, because if they don't have a lien on the 
21 personal, and half of water property is personal, 1.1 
22 million of his bid price would be half, if they don't 
23 have to pay the other creditor. 
24 THE COURT: This argument you're going to have to 
25| make in the bankruptcy court more properly there. 
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1 MR. SHIELDS: I agree. But I think the point is, 
2 there are significant factual issues. And I don't think ^ 
3 this court should make a determination that don't worry, 
4 SAIC has 96 percent of all the money you will get back. 
5 I just don't think that's accurate. 
6 Your Honor, all the facts they allegedly made 
7 $500,000 last year, and they're going to make $700,000 
8 this year. In the deposition I asked Mr. Stillman, "What 
9 is your net profit this year? " He said, "We're at a 
10 slight loss. We anticipate making a big profit at the 
11 end of the year but we don't know for sure." You know, 
12 ruling based on these allegations rather than fact, I 
13 think, is premature. SAIC attempted paying involvement 
14 of this nasty person's going to hold up for the sale. 
15 Your Honor, we have a sale. We contracted to buy 
16 this property at a price over a year and a half ago and 
17 the whole merits of our lawsuit about whether SAIC 
18 wrongfully pulled out of that contract because they 
19 thought they could sell it for more. And the merits of 
20 that case are very important. They can't get title 
21 insurance because we have the claim, and that claim --
22 that interest, and that interest cannot be wiped out by 
23 the order of the bankruptcy court order plan. And 
24 therefore, we can't put our (inaudible) until that 
25 decision has been rendered and that claim has been made, 
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1 decision rendered, and then it will be a true sale. This 
2 is not going to be a true bid next Wednesday. What 
3 they're going to do they are going to go over the 
4 conditions on that bid are going to be so uneven, that 
~~5 no one will bid. You won't get title insurance. All 
6 you're doing is buying the lawsuit, if SAIC bought it, 
7 all they're doing is buying another lawsuit that they 
8 already have with Golfland. 
9 We agree with you on the fact that the bankruptcy 
10 court should hear all these things. We also agree the 
11 bankruptcy court will not approve the sale, so we think 
12 this motion is premature. 
13 Another problem that shows the difference between 
14 BCD and SAIC, they have alleged in the motion, if you 
15 would read it, that they have the right to credit bid 
16 another lienholder who is in a similar position to 
17 Valley Asphalt. They purchased the supply, they 
18 furnished the ice rink that the water park used in the 
19 winter for skating. Up until Leonard Stillman took 
20 control of BCD there was a big dispute. Last December 
21 when SAIC caused BCD to file a motion to modify the 
22 plan, Burley (sp?) came in and raised some of the same 
23 arguments I have raised in conflict of interests that 
24 either the hearing, SAIC buys the lien from Burley, and 
25 one of the deals was that Burley was withdraw their 
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1 objections to the modification. SAIC has tried to 
2 modify their plans on two different motions and we 
3 believe this motion formally -- we believe this motion 
4 to approve the sale as a third attempt to modify the 
5 plan. Every time that they try to modify the plan it is 
6 exclusively for the benefit of SAIC and detriment of the 
7 creditor. And that's why Burley objected, and that's 
8 why they bought their claim right before Burley filed 
9 the objection. Then they bought the claim for less than 
10 half it's value and they're telling this Court they can 
11 credit it over $215,000. We don't believe that's the 
12 case, and I don't think Judge Clark is going to allow 
13 him to buy a claim at a discount, and after they bought 
14 it and disputed that BCD should continue to dispute. 
15 And after they bought it and all of a sudden drop the 
16 dispute and take a position that now that it doesn't 
17 benefit the SAIC, there is no reason to continue this 
18 dispute. 
19 In the response of the demand file, when they say 
20 there's no risk of anybody to insubordinate our claim, 
21 yet we now have Valley Asphalt in this court having the 
22 right to consider whether they have the right to stay 
23 for insubordination, I think it's substantial risk of 
24 insubordination for SAIC's claim. We do not believe in 
25| the sale of the best priced of the estates because of 
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1 term of their associated weapon including the lack of 
2 any kind of title insurance. 
3 Finally, your Honor, we're not sure that they should 
4 be in the business of operating the water park on a long 
5 term basis. My client owns many water parks throughout 
6 the Western United States. We know the risk involved, 
7 you make money some years and in other years you don't. 
8 Depending on what happens with accidents and other 
9 things it's a risky business. We don't think it's 
10 appropriate for a liquidator to ban the liquidation 
11 business and get into the water park operations. 
12 Particularly when the motivation is to deprive Golfland 
13 of it's remedy. 
14 What they've alleged in the bankruptcy court again, 
15 and we disagree with, is that what they conduct this 
16 sale to be free and clear of the interest in the 
17 Golfer. We don't think that's true, but if it is true, 
18 all they are trying to do is to deprive us of that 
19 remedy. We don't think that's proper in the course, 
2 0 thank you. 
21 THE COURT: We have denied the motion to continue the 
22 hearing date, and I'm going to authorize the liquidator 
23 to use cash in excess of $25,000 in connection with the 
24 bid. And also to use the bid that assumes the senior 
25 tax claims. We'll see you all again next week. 
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1 April 17, 1995 
2 * * * * * 
3 
4 THE COURT: I'm just thinking of the complications. 
5 Supposing I rule that that hearing and that testimony 
6 will declare estoppel and that the preconditions for the 
7 sale didn't occur, and so you go ahead and sell to the 
8 highest bidder, and you immediately sell and then Judge 
9 Sam reverses Judge Clark's. Probably still could be 
10 handled, but it might be simpler to wait. 
11 MR. CARLILE: Well, I think with that argument and 
12 appeal that we need to recognize the standard for 
13 reversal to Judge Clark -- or Judge Sam and that is 
14 going to be in the use of discretion and also the 
15 factual issues, that the likelihood of him doing that is 
16 so remote that there is very little risk for this Court 
17 to proceed today. Although I do understand what the 
18 Court's concern is. 
19 THE COURT: Do you believe that a decision in that 
20 Court is eminent? 
21 MR. CARLILE: I don't believe -- I don't do enough in 
22 bankruptcy appeals, I'm a little surprised that it 
23 hasn't been calendared already because it's been briefed 
24 now for several months, and I know what the calendar is 
25| on appeals courts, as you do also, but I'm not certain 
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1 of what it is in terms of Judge Sam's hearing for 
2 bankruptcy matters. So I would venture a guess and say 
3 that hopefully there would be a decision soon, no more 
4 oral argument on that. 
5 THE COURT: Go ahead. 
6 MR. CARLILE: Your Honor, first I want to address our 
7 motion and then address this issue about whether it's 
8 appropriate for them to file a complaint against the 
9 liquidator in this proceeding, or to try to sue the 
10 liquidator as an officer of BCD or CDX. And as we have 
11 said in our pleadings, it's important to keep that 
12 distinction clear. That the liquidator has his 
13 responsibilities to the creditors and so does American 
14 Insurance Company and as an officer of BCD or CDX has 
15 it's responsibilities to the creditors of those 
16 bankruptcy estates. We don't want that distinction to 
17 become blurred in the least for this proceeding. And 
18 I'll address the reason that becomes important in the 
19 complaint in just a moment. 
20 Mr. Shields argues that what's at stake here is the 
21 integrity of a court order, the approval of the sale. 
22 And I disagree with that in the sense that the court 
23 order has no integrity, because the terms that were 
24 presented to the Court for approval were not the terms 
25 that Golfland sought to impose and to enforce in the 
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1 supplemental agreement. Judge Stirba did not know about 
2 the concessions, Judge Clark did not know about the 
3 concessions. 
4 He further goes on to argue that the judicial --
5 that we have a duty, or that it was somehow nefarious 
6 for the liquidator in his capacity as liquidator of SAIC 
7 or an officer of these other two estates to go and talk 
8 to Golfland. Well, the liquidator and the debtor 
9 mentioned in those actual confirmed plans that it has a 
10 duty to the Court, and has a duty to the back-up bidder 
11 to keep him informed because those are Court approved. 
12 There is nothing nefarious about going to that back-up 
13 there and saying we're having trouble with the primary 
14 bidder and this is the area that a concern has arisen. 
15 In fact, it's appropriate and it would be inappropriate 
16 not to do that. And so everything that the liquidator 
17 did in that context really was in the preservation and 
18 the integrity of the process having orders entered that 
19 did not fully disclose that the Court's (inaudible). 
20 The difference in the chain of position of the 
21 liquidator, as Mr. Shields calls it, 180 degree 
22 difference. As I explained in the initial argument, Mr. 
23 Stone, at that point when he was making a deposition of 
24 testimony which really was that they had waived the 
25 warranty. Why? Because he believed that they had 
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1 misunderstood what they had. 
2 THE COURT: Mr. Carlile, the fact that the party 
3 takes inconsistent positions in the proceedings doesn't 
4 bother me at all. You don't need to waste time on that 
5 issue. 
6 MR. CARLILE: I do want to say that 2.71 million 
7 dollars is not what's striking us. The position is 
8 what's striking us. 
9 THE COURT: It almost seems like someone discovered a 
10 gold mine to have that amount, you know. 
11 MR. SHIELDS: Well, one thing we do know is that the 
12 appraisals were wrong. 
13 THE COURT: I think so. 
14 MR. SHIELDS: And there's a great deal of interest, 
15 and at this point the interest that has been expressed 
16 is the liquidator is willing to sell the barn and shed 
17 separate from the water park because there now appears 
18 to be a market for that, so that they would not be 
19 isolated on the shed, cannot be sold separately. It is 
20 a quarter and it is landlocked and so whoever buys the 
21 barn buys the shed. 
22 The issue about the negotiations with Provo City. 
23 All I would say in that respect is that the deal with 
24 Golfland had failed. At that point the liquidator was 
25| exercising his duty to find people who are interested in 
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1 buying this property. We approached anybody who had 
2 expressed an interest in purchasing that property, 
3 including Golfland, who said yeah, that they would be 
4 willing to do, and Doug Lawson on behalf of the 
5 liquidator said that we think we need to get a new court 
6 order because the old deal is not there. We got to get a 
7 supplemental order. And Dave waived the conditions of 
8 the closing. 
9 We are still down to the three issues that have not 
10 been addressed by Golfland. The reason that there was a 
11 failure of getting bankruptcy court approval for this 
12 simultaneous sale, is not because there was negotiations 
13 going on with Mr. (inaudible) and Mr. (inaudible), but 
14 because there was a chain of concessions made to 
15 Golfland which Pete disagreed with, and that was filed 
16 in the bankruptcy court. The cause of that failure was 
17 Golfland. 
18 Second issue is the tender, there is just no 
19 question, it's matter of law. You look at that letter, 
20 there was no complete unconditional tender of the 
21 price. 
22 And third, they failed to close on the day that it 
23 was scheduled to close and we offered to close on April 
24 8th, so there is no agreement in force. 
25 Now, let me just talk to the Court briefly about 
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1 filing a complaint. I find it interesting that well, 
2 what we're now arguing is that we ought to have an 
3 evidentiary hearing. We have had the evidentiary 
4 hearing. Judge Clark heard the evidence for three days 
5 and has made a determination based on those facts and 
6 findings. It would be inconsistent for this Court 
7 contrary to the principles of res judicata collateral 
8 estoppel to re-hear those issues and running the risk of 
9 having an inconsistent result. 
10 Now, looking at the complaint that they have 
11 proposed, and if the Court's had an opportunity to 
12 review that, you basically have the specific 
13 performance, breach of contract, and the negligence 
14 claim. If you have read carefully the negligence claim 
15 it says, there's a duty on the part of the liquidator to 
16 proceed to the Court prior to closing. That's a 
17 contract. Where does the duty arise? It arises out of 
18 this contract. Every claim they have got is a contract 
19 claim. Not one of those claims gets to the liquidator 
20 as an individual. 
21 There are contract claims of BCD and CDX but not the 
22 liquidator and those are appropriate. They have got a 
23 claim, and those are appropriate in this proceeding.- But 
24 they cannot get the liquidator individually on a breach 
25 of contract claim, and if there's a report, there's a 
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1 possibility, but not a breach of contract claim. 
2 The other issue is that these issues are resolved in 
3 two judicial proceedings. One is the one we're having 
4 today. If this Court determines that we ought to do the 
5 sale of Golfland, and as Mr. Shields acknowledges and is 
6 quoting a statement, it basically goes away. If this 
7 Court determines that the sale of the (inaudible) by 
8 Judge Stirba is a sale different from the one that was 
9 sought to be closed by Golfland, then it closed out the 
10 issue also, because there was no Court approval and so 
11 we -- the liquidator, acted appropriately. 
12 So as to Southern American Insurance Company, this 
13 proceeding resolved all of those claims. As to the 
14 bankruptcy proceedings, then the appeal is now in front 
15 of Judge Sam to resolve all of those claims, so there is 
16 simply no reason to have a separate complaint. But we 
17 think it's just another attempt to try to leverage the 
18 liquidator into agreeing with Golfland's position. 
19 The jurisdictional issue. There is no Court in this 
20 country that ought to have more or greater interest in 
21 the activities of the liquidator than this Court. Not 
22 bankruptcy court, it's this court. Exclusive 
23 jurisdiction of all those proceedings is in this court. 
I V 
24 The order was entered in, liquidation indicated that all 
25| claims against the liquidator and liquidation of the 
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1 estate are to be filed in this Court. And there's no 
2 exception to that. 
3 Mr. Shields says there's a difference between 
4 pre-liquidation and post -liquidation. There's no support 
5 of that statement. And if there's anything going on that 
6 ought not to be going on with the liquidator, then it is 
7 the interest of this court to supervise that. So that 
8 if there ever is a claim, it ought to be in this case. 
9 Furthermore, the claim against the estate is not the 
10 liquidator himself and so that's got to come through 
11 this court, through some kind of a claim which I'm 
12 assuming would an administrative claim, if they were 
13 able to prevail. Again, if there were a tort action it 
14 would be something else, we would have to research 
15 that. 
16 The other issue on that is in the (inaudible). It 
17 is clear that the business of insurance is left to the 
18 states. It's not to the federal courts. And so it's this 
19 court, if there's ever a claim. And we've also briefed 
20 the issue of no jurisdiction. 
21 But your Honor, the entire issue is resolved in this 
22 proceeding and with Judge Sam and there is no reason to 
23 have leave given to file a claim against the liquidator. 
24 THE COURT: Okay. Anything further? 
25 MR. SHIELDS: Quickly, your Honor, yes. 
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1 I got a call from Judge Sam's clerk a few days ago 
2 about another matter and I said, "Where are we on that 
3 appeal? " And he said it was in a pile with a bunch of 
4 bankruptcy appeals in the same period of time and we 
5 just haven't gotten to it quite yet. So I'm expecting 
6 that we'll get some ruling or notice of that, or hearing 
7 on that, quite soon. 
8 As to the claim of estoppel, these are really quite 
9 separate issues. The issues in our complaints were not 
10 addressed to the bankruptcy court here. I admit there's 
11 some related issues, but we weren't suing the liquidator 
12 in the bankruptcy court. We were on the same side as 
13 them. We were on the same side to try to convince the 
14 Court that the sale should be approved. What we're 
15 alleging in this complaint is that they have breached 
16 their duty of good faith in the contract to us. There 
17 has been no ruling by Judge Clark. In fact, Judge Clark 
18 specifically found the (inaudible) and he said, I don't 
19 find any fraud here or any bad guys. He said, I see 
20 some misunderstanding. But we didn't know the full 
21 extent of the facts until after the hearing. So I don't 
22 think there's any way that the issues raised and 
23 litigated in bankruptcy court on appeal can be estopped 
24 on the issue in the claims. They're two different 
25 issues. Different adversary and cause of action. And 
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1 even though some of the facts are related, I think that 
2 goes a little bit with the comment that the inconsistent 
3 positions taken by the liquidator are facts. It's not 
4 law. It's okay for a party to take one position, but 
5 the facts, that's -- they cannot come from under what 
6 they said about the agreement with Golfland and the 
7 liquidator. And in further support of that I'm going to 
8 quote briefly from the transcript about the closing that 
9 they say we have not addressed the issue about the --
10 three issues of why we didn't close the way in closing 
11 and I think it's a simultaneous matter. This is Mr. 
12 Monson responding to questions by Pete's attorney. The 
13 question is: 
14 Q. In connection with doing your work on 
15 these it would be necessary to implement the 
16 terms of auction and the order; did you ever 
17 indicate to anyone that you understood that the 
18 closing would take place in two weeks? 
19 A. I had discussions with Steve's attorney 
20 for Golfland following the auction. I believe I 
21 have indicated to him our interpretation of 
22 closing in two weeks was that they would deposit 
23 the funds, the purchase price and escrow. " 
24 That was done within two weeks of the purchase price 
25| and the barn was still there. 
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1 Another question on page 85 of the transcript: 
2 Q. And so in your view, Golfland complied 
3 with that provision that it closed within two 
4 weeks of the time of the answer? 
5 A. That it deposit its money in escrow. 
6 Q. Well, it closes in two weeks of the time 
7 of the auction in the phrase used in this 
8 language letter -- the phrase that's used? 
9 A. My view was that the obligation of the 
10 seller was to provide that it be deposited 
11 (inaudible) . " 
12 That happened, your Honor. We believe there's no 
13 allegation in support of the factual claim that they 
14 can't comply with that provision of the contract. 
15 As to the simultaneous closing, I have adequately 
16 addressed that. I think (inaudible) but I think I've 
17 adequately addressed the simultaneous closing. But what 
18 happened after Pete filed the motion with water park? 
19 There was never any motion filed in CBX or this case. 
20 Those orders still stand, even if those orders still 
21 stand -- even in this Court's (inaudible) pro se, if 
22 they plan to sell the share of the bond together they 
23 have to go back to the bankruptcy court and get CDX 
24 bankruptcy court approval to sell the share because that 
25| isn't before your Honor. It was the same argument that 
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1 they made with Judge Clark. So, we were led to believe 
2 that the simultaneous closing provision was going to be 
3 waived but it wasn't waived until they had the authority 
4 from Provo City. That's when we first learned that they 
5 were going to bring this up. 
6 Finally, your Honor, the appeal before Judge Sam is 
7 not an abuse of discretion. We argue it's an illegal 
8 issue. The Judge misunderstood this judicial principle 
9 in his ruling. He talks about the price, and we believe 
10 that the standards that will be used there is just the 
11 preponderance of the evidence because it's a legal 
12 issue. If the judge misunderstands the concept of what's 
13 the issue before me, am I supposed to be looking at a 
14 shock and conscience standard, or am I supposed to be 
15 giving as much money as I can because it's the state? 
16 Ironically, the liquidator never arranged that issue, we 
17 followed the supplemental memo just a few days before 
18 the hearing, but they never raised it at the opening. 
19 Very critical point, we think. 
20 Golfland is not in concession. We're not asking the 
21 Court to prove anything different than what the Court's 
22 already proved, we're just asking for the order for 
23 liquidator to proceed in the second. If we have 
24 controversy about this we would come back to the Court, 
25 but we're not going to have any controversy. Golfland 
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1 and the liquidator have agreed upon the terms of the 
2 sale. The only issue we have is this closing thing. 
3 They're saying because we didn't close any of the days, 
4 which was the day after Pete filed the motion that they 
5 should be out from under that sale. Obviously, they 
6 waived that provision by continuing to negotiate with us 
7 and there's no provision about the simultaneous 
8 closing. They can't force the simultaneous closing to 
9 anybody except for Golfland. 
10 Thank you, your Honor, we would ask the Court to not 
11 grant the liquidators motion to sell the proposed to the 
12 city, and grant the alternative motion. And we would be 
13 glad to accept that or the alternative motion to comply 
14 with the claim filed. Thank you, your Honor. 
15 MR. CARLILE: I think I'll take a couple minutes if I 
16 may. 
17 I'm thinking of the effect of Judge Sam's ruling and 
18 you need to understand that I don't believe that you 
19 could tender an adequate price of what is before Judge 
20 Sam or for a failure to close on April 9th is 
21 necessarily in front of Judge Sam. Judge Sam is a third 
22 issue so this Court could make a ruling under at least 
23 those two years and not be concerned about whether 
24 there's going to be an inconsistency with what kind of a 
25 ruling Judge Sam provides. 
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1 Now, those two issues, your Honor, I've adequately 
2 addressed the tender on the conditions, that there were 
3 conditions. 
4 On April 8th, we offered to close on the barn and 
5 the shed separately, they knew at that point we were 
6 willing to separate those properties and waive a 
7 simultaneous closing. They said no, we want to wait 
8 until the hearing. We entered negotiations based on the 
9 operating agreement which extended that closing date and 
10 they told us on June 1 they weren't going to sign the 
11 operating agreement. The time for closing expired and 
12 there was no further obligation. 
13 THE COURT: Counsel, I'm ready to rule. 
14 
2 5 • * * * * 
16 
17 
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CERTIFICATE 
STATE OF UTAH 
County of Salt Lake 
I, JULIE MANSELL, do hereby certify that the 
foregoing pages, numbered 1 through 42, contain a true 
and accurate transcript of the electronically recorded 
proceedings held in connection with Southern American 
Insurance Company held on April 17, 1995, at the Third 
District Court of Utah and was transcribed by me to the 
best of my ability from the cassette tapes furnished to 
me by the Third District Court of Utah. 
Dated this 28th day of August 1995. 
71t\u>, Mcmo>\\ 
Julie Mansell, Transcriber 
I, RENEE L. STACY, Certified Shorthand Reporter, 
Registered Professional Reporter and Notary Public for 
the State of Utah, do hereby certify that the foregoing 
transcript prepared by Julie Mansell was transcribed 
under my supervision and^ direction. 
^ A L L J\ %t^> f 
Renee L. Stacy, CSR, RPR 
My commission expires: 
<7 Lr.y Ccmm.sc.c.T Jo--
State of Lis:*"'" 
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IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT 
IN AND FOR SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
IN RE: ) CIVIL NO. 920901617 
SOUTHERN AMERICAN ) HELD: APRIL 17, 1995 
INSURANCE COMPANY, 
Respondent. 
BE IT REMEMBERED, that the above-entitled case 
came on for hearing in the Third Judicial District 
Court, 240 East 400 South, Salt Lake City, Utah, on 
April 17, 1995 before the Honorable Judge Stephen L. 
Henriod. 
* * * * 
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FOR GOLFLAND: JEFFREY L. SHIELDS 
Attorney at Law 
CALLISTER, NEBEKER & McCULLOUGH 
800 Kennecott Building 
10 East South Temple 
Salt Lake City, UT 8413 3 
FOR THE UTAH INSURANCE 
COMMISSIONER: CRAIG CARLILE 
Attorney at Lav 
RAY, QUINNEY 6 NEBEKER 
79 South Main Street 
Salt Lake City, UT 84145-0385 
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5 THE COURT: I'm ready to rule. I find that 
6 the sale in question was contingent on conditions 
7 which never occurred. I am finding that the tender 
8 with the strings that Golfland attached to it does 
9 not amount to the proper tender with respect to 
10 closing. The closing didn't occur in a timely 
11 fashion, and that the simultaneous nature of the 
12 closing was frustrated by the bankruptcy court order, 
13 so, therefore, there was no agreement, and the terms 
14 that Judge Stirba approved in her order were not 
15 terms of the sale, so that order is, likewise, 
16 ineffective. So the liquidator can go on and sell 
17 that parcel, as far as this court is concerned, to 
18 the highest and best offer. I'm not limiting you to 
19 Provo or Golfland or that new bidder, but assume that 
20 the process will go on. 
21 I MR. CARLILE: If I may, Your Honor, we have 
22 noticed all the people who have an interest in that 
23 property and, as I indicated, we have received a 
24 higher bid, and we felt that, depending on how this 
25 court ruled today, we would proceed to do a bid today 
RENEE L. STACY, CSR, RPR 
(801) 328*1188 
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1 here in the courtroom, if permissible from the court, 
2 and I think those bidders are available and willing 
3 to proceed. We did this once in the bankruptcy court 
4 and they allowed us to go ahead and do the bid. 
5 Whether you wanted to do the bid yourself or conduct 
6 the bid or just supervise or leave while we do it and 
7 come back ~ 
8 THE COURT: Hold on, Mr. Carlile. I think 
9 I foreclosed on this same property once back in the 
10 late 70's, so go ahead and conduct your sale. I am 
11 also going to grant Golfland's motion, though, to 
12 file a complaint, and I do not think this real estate 
13 is so unique that dollar damages in the event that 
14 you're successful with the complaint would not be 
15 satisfactory and sufficient. I'd like it filed in 
16 this court, though. 
17 MR. SHIELDS: I will, Your Honor. Could 
18 we ask — I'm not quite sure we got copies of where 
19 Mr. — one of the counsel for the liquidators sent to 
20 these other bidders and they mentioned they were 
21 going to try to sell here. We got sworn notice of 
22 that, emd particularly if they plan to sell the shed 
23 with it, again, I think they need to have the 
24 bankruptcy court approval on that. 
25 THE COURT: I think Golfland needs to be 
RBNEE L. STACY, CSR, RPR 
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1 part of this next sale and I think they have to have 
2 adequate notice. 
3 MR. CARLILE: We agree that they ought to 
4 be part of the sale. We would need adequate notice, 
5 though. 
6 THE COURT: Well, if you can work something 
7 out, information exchange out, or you can get a 
8 waiver on that, otherwise you may need to do it at a 
9 different time. 
10 MR. CARLILE: We can work that out. 
11 MR. SHIELDS: Let me just ask, do you 
12 intend to sell the shed with the barn property? 
13 I MR. CARLILE: Yes. 
14 MR. SHIELDS: And is there a court order 
15 from the bankruptcy court? 
16 MR. CARLILE: It would be subject to the 
17 court — bankruptcy court approving that simultaneous 
18 sale. 
19 MR. SHIELDS: I wasn't aware that there was 
20 the shed bankruptcy court approval that you say. 
21 THE COURT: I WOULD LIKE (INAUDIBLE) TO 
22 prepare a note on their motion and I'd like you to 
23 prepare am order on your motion. 
24 I MR. SHIELDS: Okay. In the order he's 
25 recited that the complaints are filed in this court? 
RENEE L. STACY, CSR, RPR 
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THE COURT: Yes. 
MR. SHIELDS: okay. Thank you. 
THE COURT: Okay. Thank you, counsel 
* * * * 
RENEE L. STACY, CSR, RPR 
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CEPTIFTCATTi 
STATE OP UTAH ) 
) ss. 
COUNTY OP SALT LAKE ) 
I, RENEE L. STACY, do hereby certify that 
the foregoing pages, numbered 1 through 6, contain a 
true and accurate transcript of the electronically 
recorded proceedings held in the matter of Southern 
American Insurance Company, respondent, on 4-17-95 
in the above-entitled court and was transcribed by 
me to the best of my ablity from the cassette tape 
furnished to me. 
Dated this 19th day of April, 1995. 
:NEE L. STAC*7, REN CSR, RPR 
My commission e x p i r e s : 
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CRAIG CARLILE (A0571) 
DOUGLAS M. MONSON (A2293) and 
BRENT D. WRIDE (A5163) of 
RAY, QUINNEY & NEBEKER 
Attorneys for Utah Insurance 
Commissioner, as Liquidator of 
Southern American Insurance Company 
79 South Main Street 
P. 0. BOX 45385 
Salt LaJce City, Utah 84145-0385 
Telephone: (801) 532-1500 
IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT OF SALT LAKE COUNTY 
STATE OF UTAH 
In re: 
Southern American Insurance 
Company, 
Respondent, 
ORDER APPROVING SALE OF 
SOUTHERN AMERICAN INSURANCE 
COMPANY HEADQUARTERS BUILDING 
FREE AND CLEAR OF LIENS, 
INTERESTS AND ENCUMBRANCES 
Civil No. 920901617 
Judge Stephen Henriod 
The "Liquidator's Motion for Supplemental Order 
Approving Sale of Southern American Insurance Company 
Headquarters Building Free and Clear of Liens, Interests, and 
Encumbrances" came on for hearing on Monday, April 17, 1995 
before the Court, the Honorable Stephen L. Henriod, District 
Judge, presiding. The Utah Insurance Commissioner, as Liquidator 
(••Liquidator11) of Southern American Insurance Company ("SAIC") 
was represented by Craig Carlile and Douglas M. Monson of Ray, 
Quinney & Nebeker. Golfland Entertainment Centers, Inc. 
(••Golfland") , which filed an Objection to the Liquidator's 
Addendum — Page 
Motion, was represented by Jeffrey L. Shields and Zachary Shields 
of Callister, Nebeker & McCullough. No evidence was taken at the 
hearing; evidence was submitted with the pleadings. After 
hearing the arguments of counsel and considering the pleadings 
and other matters submitted to this Court, this Court makes the 
following findings: 
1. Pursuant to Utah Code Ann. 5 31A-27-314(9) , the 
Liquidator seeks this Court's approval for the sale of the SAIC 
headquarters building and excess property (the "SAIC Barnw). The 
legal description of the SAIC Barn is attached as Exhibit A and 
incorporated herein. 
2. The sale of the SAIC Barn to Golfland which was 
previously approved by Judge Stirba was contingent upon 
conditions which never occurred. 
3. Golfland's tender of the purchase funds for the 
SAIC Barn with the strings that Golf land attached to it did not 
amount to the proper tender with respect to closing. 
4. The closing of the sale of the SAIC Barn to 
GoIfland did not occur in a timely fashion. 
5. The requirement for the sale of the SAIC Barn to 
Golf land for a simultaneous closing of the sale of the BCD Water 
Park was frustrated by an order of the United States Bankruptcy 
Court for the District of Utah, so therefore there was no 
agreement• 
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6* Judge Stirba's February 24, 1994 Order authorizing 
the sale of the SAIC Barn to Golfland is ineffective because the 
terms of sale that Judge Stirba approved in her Order were not 
the terms of the sale that was frustrated by the Bankruptcy Court 
Order. 
7. The SAIC Barn is not so unique that dollar damages 
in the event that Golfland is successful in its complaint against 
the Liquidation Estate would not be satisfactory and sufficient. 
Based upon the foregoing findings, the Court hereby 
ORDERS as follows: 
A. The Liquidator is hereby authorized to sell the 
SAIC Barn for the highest and best offer to be approved by this 
Court after an auction to be conducted by the Liquidator. 
B. The sale of the SAIC Barn is not limited to either 
Provo City or Golfland or the new bidders. 
C. The Liquidator shall provide adequate notice of the 
auction of the SAIC Barn to Golfland and provide Golfland an 
opportunity to bid at such auction. 
D. The sale of the SAIC Barn real property (described 
in Exhibit "A" attached hereto) is free and clear of all liens 
and encumbrances, with any valid liens and encumbrances to attach 
to the proceeds of the sale in their respective priorities. 
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DATED this 2- day °* __. 1995, 
BY THE COURT: 
The Honorable Stephen L. Henriod 
ftdstrict Judge 
STAMP USED AT DIRECTION OF JUDGE 
CLERK'S CERTIFICATE OF 8ERVTCB 
I hereby certify that true and correct copies of the 
foregoing ORDER APPROVING SALE OF SOUTHERN AMERICAN INSURANCE 
COMPANY HEADQUARTERS BUILDING FREE AND CLEAR OF LIENS, INTERESTS 
AND ENCUMBRANCES were served by United States first class mail, 
postage prepaid, this _/£_ day of QA^L^. 1995, to: 
j. Ray Barrios 
Assistant Attorney General 
50 South Main Street, Suite 900 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84144 
Michael F. Skolnick 
KIPP & CHRISTIAN 
175 East 400 South, #330 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111 
Ted Boyer 
CLYDE, PRATT & SNOW 
201 South Main Street, Suite 1000 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111-2208 
Jeffrey L. Shields 
CALLISTER, DUNCAN 6 NEBEKER 
10 East South Temple, /800 
Salt Lake City, UT 84133 
Harold Reiser 
JARDINE, LINEBAUGH, BROWN i DUNN 
370 East South Temple, Suite 400 
Salt Lake City, UT 84111 
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Mona Lyman 
MCKAY, BURTON 6 THURMAN 
10 East South Temple, Suite 600 
Salt Lake City, UT 84133 
Kim R. Wilson 
SNOW, CHRISTENSEN & MARTINEAU 
P. 0. Box 45000 
Salt Lake City, UT 84145 
Max Rabner 
BTS Investments 
750 North 200 West, Suite 101 
Provo, UT 84601 
Gary L. Gregerson 
Provo City Attorney 
P. O. Box 1849 
Provo, UT 84601 
Louis Crandall 
275 East Center Street 
Provo, Utah 84606 
Brent McQuarrie 
34 South 300 East 
Provo, Utah 84606 
Bryan Ferre 
402 East 620 South 
Salem, Utah 84651 
David 0. Jeffs 
90 North 100 East 
Provo, Utah 84606 
Gary Brinton 
Princeton Place, L.C. 
1014 East 2620 North 
Provo, Utah 84604 
l223CB.ar+mm 
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Exhibit "k" to Ord€ 
SAIC B a n Property and Excess i-and 
The following real property located in the City of Provo, County 
of Utan, State of Utah, described as follows: 
Beginning at the East end of the South line of 3 00 North Street, Provo, 
Utah, said point being located South 738.84 feet and East 80.62 feet and 
South 89° 31' 36" East 998.04 feet from the West one-quarter corner of 
Section 5, Township 7 South, Range 3 East, Salt Lake Base and Meridian; 
thence North 00° 08' 00" West 43.42 feet to the East end of the North 
line of said 300 North Street; thence South 89° 30' 30" East along the 
projected North line of said 3 00 North Street 505.62 feet to the West 
bank of the Upper East Union Canal; thence Southerly along the Westerly 
bank of said canal the following four (4) courses: South 33° 34' 00" 
West 50.39 feet and South 08° 43' 30" West 232.11 feet and South 06° 12' 
30" East 136.42 feet; thence South 68° 36' 31" West 154.60 feet; thence 
South 21° 23' 29" East 30.90 feet; thence South 00° 44' 21" West 50.00 
feet; thence North 89° 15' 39" West 171.94 feet to the East bank of the 
Lower East Union Canal; thence North 19° 50' 00" West 195.49 feet along 
said canal bank; thence North 19° 24' 54" West 159.62 feet along said 
canal bank; thence North 15° 36' 27" West 119.48 feet; thence North 00° 
08' 00" West 51.81 feet to the point of beginning. 
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